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The main purpose of this thesis is to evaluate Afghanistan's 
future economic prospects especially in the aftermath of Russian 
occupation and the prolonged Islamist armed resistance by the 
peoples of Afghanistan. To achieve this goal, it is, however, 
necessary to provide some historical background about the country 
and to review the nation's economic progress before the onset of 
the Russian war (1979-1989) . While the presentation of this thesis 
has a historical dimension, it investigates and evaluates the 
consequences of communist rule and Soviet occupation. The thesis 
contains several parts including a conclusion and a policy 
recommendation. However, the problems of economic reconstruction 
and development in war ravaged Afghanistan are deep rooted and 
complies requiring many areas of study. Lack of data suitable for 
econometric analysis precludes the use of econometric techniques 
while proposing a policy recommendation.
Historical Background
Afghanistan, in today's world and especially regional 
political economy, is of crucial importance for several reasons. 
Among them are its geographic location, its rich natural resources,
and, to some extent, its size and population, Afghanistan covers 
some 253,000 square miles (647,497 square kilometers), an area 
equal to the size of Texas in the USA. The country is bordered 
with Iran in the west, Turkministan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan 
(the former Soviet central Asian states) in the north, People1s 
Republic of China in north east, and Pakistan in east and south 
east.
Because of its geostrategic location, Afghanistan has 
experienced various anti-colonial wars against foreign aggressors. 
The Afghan nation preferred to remain backward and underdeveloped 
but free and in isolation with full protection of their national 
identity. A former Afghan king, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, defines 
Afghanistan as "Land of insolence”, "Land of unruly”, and "Land of 
free”1.
Britain and Russian superpowers considered Afghanistan as a 
cross-road towards warm waters of Indian Ocean. The geo-strategic 
significance of Afghanistan had alerted both Russia and Great 
Britain to pay serious attention to this relatively impoverished 
nation. During late 19th and early 20th centuries, Afghanistan was 
involved in three major wars against the British-Indian empire 
which had significantly affected the economic conditions of the 
country. Upon gaining independence from Britain in 1919, the 
country faced many socio-political crises. These crises seriously 
damaged the poorly developed economic infrastructure of the 
country.
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On the other hand, the Russians, always dreaming of having 
access to warm waters of Indian ocean, were planning to annex 
Afghanistan to their national territory. The antagonistic dream of 
Russians was clearly explained by Afghan King, Abdul Rahman Khan 
(1880-1901), who had spent many years in exile in Tsarist Russian 
colonies of Western Turkistan (Russian Central Asia).
The Afghan king states, "The friendship of Afghanistan is of 
no service to Russia whatsoever, beyond allowing her to pass 
through the country to India, which means placing Afghanistan under 
the foot of Russia"2 The late king's advice to his successors was, 
"Though my soul will go to God, my spirit will remain in 
Afghanistan. My last words to you my sons and successors, are: 
Never trust the Russians"3. A Russian General, Skobelew, a long 
time ago, had said, "the incredible logic of facts indicates and 
time is approaching when the Hindukush, the natural boundary of 
India, will form the boundary of Russia and empire"4. Based on the 
late king, Amir Abdur Rahman's experience and the former Russian 
General's saying, it is clear that Russians, for a long time, kept 
their greedy eyes on Afghanistan and planned to extend their geo­
strategic power beyond the Hindukush mountains towards south Asia. 
The invasion of Afghanistan which brought about the worst tragedy 
of the century upon the Afghan nation was not an accident. 
Unfortunately, the Amir Abdur Rahman's successors never took his 
words as seriously as they should have. The consequences of long 
term Afghan-Soviets friendship ended with a complete destruction of 
Afghanistan.
The impetus for Soviet Russia to invade Afghanistan may 
have been two fold: First, Afghanistan occupies a prime place in 
Russian1s strategic policies towards south Asia, particularly the 
Indian ocean and i®r> gulf. Second, Afghanistan is rich in
natural resources. The exploitation of Afghan natural resource was 
monopolized by the Soviets. The country possesses rich deposits of 
iron ore and copper, each believed to be the third largest deposits 
in the world. Other rich deposits are chromium, lead, zinc, 
molybdium, gold, barite, sulphur, asbestos, lapis lazuli, and 
various precious and semi-precious stones.
However, some foreign companies showed eagerness to help 
Afghanistan in exploring its natural resources but the Soviets 
deprived them and managed to control and undertake all natural 
resource explorations in the country. Afghanistan's natural gas 
industry which accounts for more than 50% of total exports of the 
country, has been piped from northern Afghanistan to former Soviet 
central Asia and sold at a price far below the international market 
price. The former USSR paid Afghanistan in terms of barter- 
exchange, principally of low quality consumer goods, oil products 
and food stuffs. The newly discovered uranium deposits around 
Kabul airport, Khawja Rawash, was also explored and shipped into 
former USSR during Soviets occupation. Indeed, Afghans were forced 
to pay the cost of the occupation and destruction of their 
homeland.
For a decade the Soviet friend had been bombing villages, 
towns, and cities around the country. They destroyed the already
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poor economic infrastructure of the innocent nation and looted 
whatsoever precious jewelry or other personal properties they 
found. The late Afghan Mujahideen commander, Qazi Islamuddin, told 
an American journalist: "The Russians are destroying irrigation
channels, and burning crops, deriving prices up, undermining the 
economy, and yet know that the Afghans' commitment is unwavering 
even if we have to eat grass we will never surrender”.5 Such was 
the Afghans response to foreign aggressors through its history.
Nevertheless, post-World War II was the era of socio-economic 
development and rapid educational progress in Afghanistan. The 
economy was, to some extent, growing in the right direction. 
Living standard was improving and literacy was on the rise 
throughout the country. However, the economic growth and 
development was slow when compared with the rest of the developing 
nations. Law and order established, roads and bridges were 
expanding, and trade and commerce were extended beyond domestic 
markets.
Today, as a result of fourteen years of warfare, the peoples 
of Afghanistan live in misery, disaster, and chaos. Law and order 
is disrupted; hundreds of schools and administrative buildings are 
turned into rouble; industries and factories are severely damaged; 
private houses are ruined and looted by various unknown armed 
groups. People of Kabul city, the capital, are being harassed and 
tortured by various armed factions. The destruction caused by 
skirmishes between rival guerrilla factions over power may reach 
millions of dollars. As a result of brutal rocket shillings of
5
rival groups, there is a mass population movement from Kabul city 
to either Pakistan or other cities around the country.
The infant Islamic government of Afghanistan failed to gain 
substantial support or recognition from various feuding guerrilla 
factions. The Afghans dream of freedom, liberty, peace, and 
security has been perished largely due to the short sightedness of 
their political warlords who encourage the innocent uneducated 
people to fight on so that their warlord can assume power.
Should the political situation improve and peace and security 
be restored, Afghanistan would be a land of opportunity for 
businesses and investors. The country is rich in natural 
resources, raw material, and cheap labor. Some bankrupt industries 
can shift part of their plants to Afghanistan and manufacture 
products with the same quality at a considerably cheap cost thereby 
regaining competitive power in foreign markets. On the other hand, 
Afghanistan can be a large market for capital intensive industrial 
products.
Should the status quo change and the safety of foreign 
investment be guaranteed, foreign investors will boost up their 
profits by investing in this country.
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Afghanistan, one of the world1s less developed countries, was 
ranked among the lowest income states before the 1978 coup. 
The nation's annual per capita income was $130 and GNP per 
capita for the year 1979 was estimated at $170. The UN 
statistics for the year 1975 ranks Afghanistan at 108th place 
among the 129 developing countries. Average life expectancy 
was 40 years and the literacy rate was below ten percent. The 
country's economic situation, to some extent, improved through 
out 1970s. However, the growth trend remained significantly 
low compared to the rest of the developing nations. The 
economy's real growth during the three years period prior to 
1978 was one percent each year. The average annual real growth 
between 1970-78 was 2.7 percent.1
Economic Conditions Prior to 1978
During the 1970s, the Republic of Afghanistan under 
President Daud's leadership strengthened its economic 
relationship with the former USSR and laid down development 
plans that incorporated more state interference and complete 
control over natural resource exploitation. In addition, more 
attempts were made to improve the public sector.
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Investment in heavy industry was completely undertaken by 
the government of the Republic of Afghanistan. The 
construction of roads, airports, irrigation canals, electric 
power stations, school buildings, heavy industries, and 
natural resource exploitation had improved markedly during the 
1970s. Tens of thousands of buses and trucks transported 
people and goods around the country. Two major airlines, 
Ariana Afghan Airlines and Bakhter Airlines were operating: 
Ariana Afghan Airlines provided international services linking 
the country with foreign nations, while Bakhter Airlines 
provided domestic services linking major cities with the 
capital city, Kabul.
The largest part of national production was derived from 
agriculture and industries. Table 2-1 shows the country's GNP 
in the spheres of material production. In late 1970s, 
agriculture and industries accounted for more than 66.6 
percent of the GNP. The Afghan economy indubitably has an 
agrarian character. Therefore, the volume of agricultural 
output which depends entirely on weather conditions has a 
profound impact on both the nation's growth rate of GNP and 
its structure. Agriculture was operated mainly by the private 
sector and provided more than 50 percent of the national 
income. The government interfered in this sector and 
established some state owned farms. In 1974, the Afghan 
government bought out and nationalized the country's four 
major private cotton companies.
9
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Source: Afghanistan Past and Present "Social Sciences Today" 
Editorial Board USSR Academy of Sciences, p. 225.
The public sector share of agriculture dropped to a 
low of 15 percent of GNP in 1978 compared to a 48 percent 
share in construction for the same year.
Furthermore, in 1975, the Republic of Afghanistan 
launched a futile effort to change the prevailing agrarian 
structure through implementation of a land reform act. The 
law passed in April 1975, imposed a farm size limit of 20-40 
hectares based on the type and quantity of soil. The surplus 
over and above the limit was redeemed by the state and 
redistributed to landless peasants. The owners were supposed 
to be compensated over a period of 25 years and the recipients 
were supposed to pay for the land they received over the same
10
period. Despite the high share of agriculture in total 
national income, the Afghan farms generated revenue was merely
1.2 percent of national income. In order to increase the 
government revenue, the Republic of Afghanistan passed a 
progressive land taxation act in 1976. But the land taxation 
act failed to raise state revenue.
Animal husbandry was also operated by private farmers and 
pastoral nomadic herders. The country raised the world's 
largest flocks of Karakul sheep whose pelts were sold in 
London and New York markets. Karakul pelt (the persian lamb 
skin) was one of the major exportable items that fetched hard 
currency for the country. In order to improve Karakul 
raising, the government established the Afghan Karakul 
Institute in 1966. As a result the Karakul pelt production 
increased and by 1969 about 14.5 million skins were auctioned 
in London and New York markets. In this year the country sold 
100 percent of the exported skins compared to 50 percent in
1867.2
During 1970s, Afghanistan followed a policy of "mixed and 
guided economy" which encouraged further domestic and foreign 
private investment. Previously the Afghan economy was shaped 
through a series of 5-year plans beginning from 1956-1974. 
During this period, the state's capital investments was 71.4 
billion Afghanis. Capital investments included investment in 
gas, chemical, textiles, food, construction enterprises, and 
several power projects. Additionally, all investments in new
11
heavy industry and power stations were undertaken by the 
state. But the state had limited power to expand existing 
heavy industrial enterprises. Shortage of well trained and 
skilled labor lack of appropriate technology, dependence on 
foreign aid and loans together with corruption and inflated 
administration costs were the main obstacles to further 
development.
President Daud launched a seven year economic plan which 
attempted to pursue a policy that attached "great importance 
to the creation of heavy industries such as mineral 
extraction, machinery manufacturing units, chemical and power 
industries, etc. which are basically necessary for rapid 
economic growth and for maintenance of an independent 
economy."3 Further development was made in the public sector 
and state owned industries. The share of state owned 
enterprises in the gross national output of industries was 
about 69 percent for the 1978. Table 2-2 shows the share of 
the public sector of gross production for domestic industries.
The nation's financial opportunities were also limited 
and even a small increase in taxes were strongly resisted by 
the well-to-do sector of the economy. The tax policy was not 
appropriate and a larger part of the population refused to pay 
any kind of taxes. As a result, most of the country's 
development projects were financed by aid and loans received 
from abroad. More than 75 percent of state capital investments 
for the period (1956-77) were provided by foreign sources.
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Table 2-2 % Share of the Public Sector in GNP of the Afghan 
Industries.
Industries % Share










Source: "Afghanistan Past and Present" Social Science Today, 
Editorial Board USSR Academy of Science, PP.227-228.
All banks in Afghanistan were under state control. 
The Afghan National Bank, the nation's largest and oldest 
bank, was the only private bank in the country. In 1975, the 
Republic of Afghanistan passed a new banking law in order to 
reorganize the banking system and thus to expand the public 
sector economy. Under the new law all banks in Afghanistan 
including the National Bank were nationalized. In this way 
the state took control over a major portion of the private 
industrial sector as well.
Economic Conditions After 1978
Although the economic growth rate was considerably low, 
the Afghan economy was expanding and the nation's living 
standard, to some extent, was improving prior to the communist 
coup in 1978. However, after the communist take over and the
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subsequent Soviet invasion*, the Afghan economy stagnated due 
to social unrest, intensive military hostilities, the 
destruction of villages, roads, irrigation systems, electric 
power stations, industrial enterprises, and communication 
systems. The already poor economic infrastructures was 
completely devastated. As a consequence of the communist's 
bloody coup, most bilateral and multilateral assistance to the 
country, other than from socialist block, were halted. Some 
industrialized countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Republic of Germany, and Japan ceased their aid 
programs to Afghanistan completely. The Asian Development 
Bank halted all its projects in the country by 1980. The 
World Bank also stopped assisting the Soviet installed regime.
However, it is very hard to provide a real economic 
profile of the country because the information released by the 
communist regimes of Afghanistan seems dubious and inaccurate. 
Also the continuing civil war, population displacement, 
communication and transportation problems, and lack of 
reliable sources have made the task more difficult.
Despite the clear cut facts that indicate the economic 
destruction of the country, the communist regime claimed some 
improvement in the nation's economic condition which is 
contrary to reality. The government officials estimated the 
country's GNP for 1987 at $3,156 million which shows about 5.2 
percent increase compared to 1986. GNP per capita for the 
same year was estimated at $155-160. The overall economic
14
growth between 1980-86 was announced to be at an annual rate 
of less than 2 percent, larger than the rate before the war. 
It was claimed that agriculture, the country's main economic 
sector, contributed 64.5 percent of net material product (NMP) 
in 1987. The regime claimed 0.7 percent increase in 
agricultural output for the year 1987. In the northern 
provinces which included the vast majority of the agricultural 
land, people only cultivate wheat, barely, maze, and rice to 
meet their immediate needs. Such activities have been stopped 
in areas surrounding the cities. J. Bruce Amstutz quotes a 
resistance commander of the north saying, "sugar beets, 
cotton, oil yielding seeds and plants, are no longer produced. 
Also chemical fertilizer. .. cannot be obtained. "4 Industrial 
enterprises contributed an estimated 21.1 percent of the NMP, 
and a 3.5 percent increase in industrial output was claimed 
for the same year. Aside from the regime1s claims, industries 
have been badly affected by fourteen years of warfare. Scores 
of industries, both large and small, in the country have 
stopped functioning completely, whereas the remainder are 
functioning with difficulties. Amstutz again quotes the 
resistance commander as saying, "For lack of raw materials, 
the textile mills at Puli-Khumri and Balkh have come to a 
stand-still. Factories in Mazar which employed 8,000 workers 
now are reduced to employing 800, mostly administrative 
staff... The Spinzer vegetable oil plant, established in 
Kunduz in 1953 ... is hardly reaching 5 percent of its former
15
production. The Sugar mill at Baghlan is in the same 
situation."5
According to the IMF sources in 1989 Afghanistan recorded 
a $220.6 million trade deficit and a $217.1 million deficit in 
its balance of payment. The Eastern block accounted for 68 
percent of the country's total foreign trade. More than 60 
percent of the nation's total foreign trade was enj oyed by the 
former USSR. According to the DRA estimation about 97 percent 
of a total of $223.3 million in foreign aid to Afghanistan was 
provided by the former Soviet Union and other member states of 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The former 
USSR contributed 81 percent of the total foreign aid to 
Afghanistan. The country's total external debt was estimated 
at $1,499 million in 1987. The annual inflation rate remained 
at 20 percent between 1980-85, which has increased 
tremendously since then.
Afghanistan health condition improved throughout the 
1970s. In 1980 there were 68 hospital establishments with 
4,837 beds and 1,160 physicians working in government health 
services. Serious damage have occurred to the country's 
health centers since 1978. The average life expectancy at 
birth between 1980-85 had fallen to 36 years compared to 38 
years in 1970, Which is the lowest life expectancy in Asia. 
Infant mortality for the same period was the highest in Asia. 
However, the government officials in 1988 assessed a total of 
196 medical centers and hospitals with 1,931 physicians.
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The educational sector also has been severely damaged by 
war. The total enrollment at primary and secondary schools 
declined fror-. 2? rircent in 1981 to 14 percent in 1986. The 
UNESCO estimates Afghanistan's adult illiteracy at 76.3 
percent in 1985 which is the highest in Asia. The communist 
regime in 1987 claimed that about 400,000 students attended
20.000 literacy courses through out the country. Higher 
education was also disrupted by departure of many qualified 
professors, students, and other academic staff. A total of
15.000 Afghan student were enrolled in the former USSR 
universities by 1987. Many colleges and some universities 
were closed since the Soviet withdrawal. Kabul University, 
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THE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE OF 
AFGHANISTAN
The infrastructure of a nation consist of supporting 
institutions such as financial institutions, educational 
institutions, health care, transportation, and its social 
welfare system. This chapter will focus on the infrastructure 
of the Afghanistan nation in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal 
from the country.
Financial Institutions
Afghanistan's financial system consists of both formal 
and informal interconnected financial institutions. The 
central bank of Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Bank, is 
responsible for managing and controlling the money supply and 
completely supervising organized financial activities. The 
formal financial system, which is comprised of commercial 
banks, saving banks, development banks, insurance companies, 
and investment banks was completely controlled by government.
Most of the country's transactions are still made in the 
informal financial system. For example, local money lending, 
trade credits, cooperative credits to name a few are largely 
operating in an informal and unorganized financial system.
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This sector has, to some extent, monopolized the financial 
operations and money transactions inside the country. After 
the Great Depression many economists realized the importance 
of financial policy and conceded that the monetary factor can 
indeed affect both output and employment in less developed 
countries. The establishment of well-organized financial 
institutions was necessary in Afghanistan, at least for the 
purpose of foreign trade as well as for internal financial 
transactions.
The monetary policies adopted in both King Zaher's and 
President Daud's eras were rather vague and unclear to many 
Afghan people. These facts kept people from trusting the 
governments of the time and depositing their monetary assets 
in the banks managed and controlled by the government. As a 
result, the use of money was not pervasive in the country and 
thus monetary policy had limited power. Trade and exchange of 
consumption and other sumptuary items were made on a barter 
basis in rural areas which consists of about 80% of the Afghan 
population. However as the country developed and started its 
modernization process, the real money stock rose faster than 
the value of output. The use of money was extended to remote 
areas, and to particularly large and crowded cities. Still, 
the demand for money in Afghanistan was not high enough prior 
to the Second World War. The reliance on money for 
transactions was very weak in some parts of the country. 
Before 1920, no bank existed in Afghanistan and all trades and
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financial activities of the government were undertaken by 
foreign and local domestic merchants through open market 
operationso Money was exchanged only in bazaars of the main 
cities such as Kabulr Mazari-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Qandahar.
When Afghanistan became independent from British 
occupation in 1919, it faced several socio-political crises. 
The novel modernizing reforms launched by King Amanullah were 
seriously thwarted by nationwide resistance, because such 
reforms were contrary to the social, religious, and cultural 
values of Afghan people. Government corruption, official 
operation, and foreign interferences could be other reasons 
that resulted in the ousting of King Amanullah. Amanullah, 
however, was blamed for following the instructions of Linin, 
the Soviets Communist Revolutionary leader. Later, Amanullah 
was replaced by Amir Habibullah II, popularly referred to as 
Bachi Saqaw (the son of water career), who ruled the country 
for 6 months and then was ousted by General Nader with the 
help of the British and some domestic tribal chieftains from 
the southern part of Afghanistan.
During Amanullah's reign, the only monetary institution 
operating in Afghanistan was the Joint Stock Company managed 
by an Afghan capitalist, Abdul Majid Zabuli who was, at that 
time, working in Moscow as representative of his company. 
During the Nader era, Zabuli returned to Afghanistan and 
prepared an economic plan for the country and advised the 
Afghan monarch to establish a modern banking system in the
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country. The country was in serious need of an appropriate 
financial policy which would help economic development. 
Financial intermediaries which could stand between the initial 
savings depositor and the ultimate investor rarely existed; 
therefore, the amount of saving was almost negligible. If the 
government wanted to overcome its severe economic problems, 
financial institutions which would accumulate small amounts to 
finance larger projects and acquire costly investment 
information were desperately needed. The emergence of 
commercial banks, for example, was helpful but the issue of 
interest rate remained controversial among Afghan politicians 
and religious scholars who became a "dead squash" for the 
implementation of a traditional banking system.
The Afghan economy, for a long time, relied on a barter 
system and operated in a primitive way. The Afghan currency 
called Afghani was the medium of exchange in cities while the 
relative prices of goods and services were, in most cases, 
accounted for in rural areas of the country. An official rate 
of Af45 per U.S. Dollar was set on May 21, 1979. Later, it 
was revised to Af45.85 and then to Af50.60 per U.S. dollar. 
Table 3-1 shows the official exchange rates in Afghanistan for 
the years 1985-88. The nation's gold stock (30.02 metric 
tons) valued at $245.06 million in 1984 has not changed since 
1980. The nation's SDRs has been estimated at $13.99 millions 
in 1986, $14.9 millions in 1987, and $12.8 millions in 1988.
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Table 3-1i Official Exchange Rate (Afghani per US $ at 
the end of the year).
1985 1986 1987 1988
Official Rate 4 5.0 O' 45.00 45.00 45.00
Effective Rate 50.00 50.60 50.60 50.60
Commercial Bank 
Rate
— — 175.00 241.00








Exchange reserves estimated for the same three years 
amounted to $238.61 million(-14%) , $257.9 million, and $241.8 
million respectively. The currency circulation for the fiscal 
years of 1986-88 increased by 11 percent, 58 percent, and 35 
percent respectively. The cost of living for the same three 
years jumped to 91 percent in 1986, 18 percent in 1987 and 29 
percent in 1988.1
The US dollars and British sterling are still the major 
daily exchanged currencies in Kabul's money bazaars. The 
trade of Indian and Pakistani rupees, as well as the Iranian 
Rial, is considerably smaller than the large Afghani turnover 
in those countries. The transaction of the Russian Ruble was 
significantly weak in Kabul bazaars prior to the communist 
take over in 1978. Since then, however, it is widely 
circulating in the Kabul money bazaars. Russian troops and 
officials are alleged to have smuggled a large amount of bank 
notes back into the former Soviet Union. Soviet Airlines were 
blamed as the main carriers of such operations. A
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considerable amount of Russian banknotes were also exchanged 
in Hong-Kong and Singapore money markets. According to 
reports published in the World Currency Year Book(WCYB), even 
ranking members of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan(PDPA) , such as ex-president Karma 1's brother, were 
involved in smuggling operations. The report further 
indicates that a high ranking Soviet embassy official and a 
civilian adviser were also involved in these operations.
In 1973, with the devaluation of the US dollar and the 
overthrow of King Zaher, rumors spread over the new regime 
under Daud, the King's cousin, would fix Afghani at an 
official rate and close the free market bazaars. As a result, 
the Afghan money dealers restricted transactions and reserved 
currency in Afghanis which made the US dollar decline to as 
low as Af50.60 per US dollar. But later, with the 
government's failure to implement this policy, a huge amount 
of money re-entered the Kabul bazaars. In 1975, as a result 
of jobs offered to about 500,000 Afghans in Iran and Persian 
Gulf States, the Afghani value began to improve sharply as 
Af41.25 was exchanged against per US dollar. Despite the 
communist coup in 1978 and their intention of "collectivizing” 
the Afghan bazaars, the Afghani's value had increased steadily 
to as high as Af36.15 per US dollar.2
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The Banking System
The banking system in Afghanistan was, however, less 
developed and so limited that it could hardly fulfill the 
prerequisites of a contemporary banking system which are 
essential to keep both stability and growth in the economy. 
Modern banks, as borrowers and lenders, are considered as 
financial intermediaries that seek profits out of their daily 
activities. Moreover, with the emergence of commercial banks 
that earn most of their income from interest received from 
loans, the banking functions and activities had increased and 
thus the money stock also increased. Today banks are an 
integral parts of any economy through which almost all 
monetary and financial activities are made. Bank functions in 
Afghanistan, until 1978, were limited to the transaction of 
money and issuance of loan and credits. However, the 
financial activities of Afghan banks were mainly concentrated 
in Kabul because most of the foreign trade and commercial 
business was located there. Later, Afghan banks opened 
limited branches in various major cities which was a good 
initiative in organizing a monetary system. But people were 
not yet familiar with modern banks and hence the bank's 
functions were limited.
One of the main barriers to banking expansion in 
Afghanistan was the absolute government control of them. A 
new banking law adopted in 1975, intended to nationalize the 
banks and improve the public sector of the economy. This
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step, however, enabled the regime to control major private 
industrial enterprises and strengthened the regime' s far-flung 
programs.
The Bank of Afghanistan6 s reserves, excluding gold 
reserves of 965,000 troy ounces, amounted to $243.69 million 
in 1989.2 This amount was reduced by 13 percent from 1987 to 
1989. The Bank of Afghanistan's reserves for the years 1987- 
89 are shown in Table 3-2.









Foreign Exchange 257.90 241.80 226.65
Total 279.68 261.12 243.69
* Figures in table exclude gold reserves totaling 965,000 
troy ounces since 1980.
Source: Europe Year Book p.287, IMF, International
Finance Statistics.
The following table provides a list of Afghanistan banks and 
their foundation dates and main functions. In 1978 all banks 
in Afghanistan, including Banki Mili (The National Bank) which 
is the county's oldest and largest bank, were nationalized by 
communist regime.
This demagogic statute had affected Afghanistan's weary 
population drastically. Both upper and middle class domestic 
capitalists either fled the country or transferred their
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wealth to foreign banks in order to hide it from the greedy 
eyes of the communists*
Table 3-3: Banks of Afghanistan.
Name






Main Functions & Wealth 
of Bank after 1978.
Banknote issue, foreign 
exchange regulation,credit 
extensions to banks, leading 
enterprises and companies, 
government & private 
depository, Government fiscal 
agency, Cap. up. 4000m.
Res.5299m, Dep.15,008m and 
brs.65
Agricultural 1959
Development Bank of 
Afghanistan, 1987











Credits for farmers, 
cooperatives and agro­
business, aid received from 
IBRD & UNDP, Cap.666.8m,
Res.498.7m, total resources 
3,188.3m
Finances factories, light 
industries and enterprises, 
printed money before the 
establishment of Da 
Afghanistan Bank, and several 
other financial activities. 
Cap.1000m, Res.100.7m, brs.
68, total resources 6,954.8m.
Provides finances for exports 
and export oriented 
investments. Total assets
12,904.1m.
Provides finances for 
industrial development. Total 
financial resources including 
capital 2,500m.
provides short & long term 
building loans. Authorized 
cap. 200m, cap. pu. 100m
Pashtani Tejarati Bank 
(Afghan Commercial 
Bank) 1987
1954 Provides short term credits,
forwarding facilities, opening 
letters of credits, purchase 
and sale of foreign exchanges, 
Cap.pu.1000m, dep.7,085.7m, 
total assets 19,826.4m
*Cap.̂ Capital, Res.=Reserve, Dep.=Deposit, Cap.pu.=Capital 
paid up, brs.=Branches. The amount shown is in Afghanis. 
Source: Europe Year Book, P.294
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The bank's functions, therefore, were mostly confined to 
governmental transactions and state related trade activities.
Monetary Policy
Financial institutions in the early eighteenth century 
were limited to two main sectors, the real sector and the 
monetary sector. The real sector of the economy was believed 
to determine the allocation of resources available in the 
society by the use of general tools such as demand and supply. 
The monetary sector was supposed to determine the price level 
and wage rates. Economists of the time had criticized the 
expansion of money, arguing that the increase in the amount of 
money might increase prices instead of increasing the supply 
of goods produced. Hence it would inevitably make the economy 
worse off. Donald P. Morgan writes, "if policy makers 
increase the money supply in an effort to reduce unemployment 
the only long run effect will be inflation"2. Furthermore, 
the amount of a particular commodity produced depends on the 
relative price of that commodity and its demand in the market. 
In Afghanistan, of course, the rapid increase in money supply 
to finance the bloody war had dramatically raised the nominal 
prices of goods and services. Inflation is, therefore, 
rampant and quite uncontrollable in the country. The 
tremendous increase in money supply has boosted the general 
price level almost by 1400 percent and hence raised the demand
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for nominal money. Indeed, it is hard, if not impossible, to 
believe an existing monetary equilibrium in Afghani economy, 
because the supply of money exceeds its demand in real terms.
According to economic theory the quantity of money 
demanded depends on the rate of interest and on both nominal 
income and the level of prices. Only increases in the general 
price level can be pinned upon the pervasive inflation 
affecting the Afghan economy. However, scarcity and shortage 
of food stuffs, unavailability of consumption goods and 
necessary items, that emerged as a result of a decade of 
destructive warfare, can be the main reasons for the rapid 
increase in prices. The communist regime blocked the supply 
routes to rural areas in order to put pressure on resistance 
forces as well as civilians so that those who couldn't afford 
to live would either flee the country or join the government 
armed forces to obtain a higher salary which would help defray 
their financial expenses. On the contrary, the resistance 
forces blocked all supply routs under their control especially 
highways that connected the rural areas to major cities to 
intensify pressure on the government. The real victims of 
these counteractions were in fact the poor Afghan civilians. 
In Afghanistan the residents of major cities depend on food 
stuffs and necessary consumption items produced in rural 
areas. The counteractions by the two warring sides had 
adversely affected the prices inside the country and forced 
many Afghans to flee the so called "communist utopia" while
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facing a dubious future as displaced refugees either in rural 
areas inside the country or in neighboring Iran and Pakistan.
The use of an appropriate monetary policy in Afghanistan 
would help curb rampant inflation and thus stabilize the price 
level and restore a better employment level. In this regard, 
given the socio-political conditions of Afghanistan, the 
contraction monetary policy, though hard at the present 
juncture, would help achieve several significant goals, for 
example: eradication of the high rate of unemployment,
reducing the inflation rate, increasing growth of real GNP, 
achieving balance of payments, share of public versus private 
spending, and equitably distributing income.3 The use of an 
appropriate fiscal policy that would balance government 
spending and tax collection is seriously needed in 
Afghanistan. In the past 14 years of tragic war, the Afghan 
government was not in a position to use fiscal policy; taxes 
were not collected and government spending was not made to 
improve the nation's living standard. On the other hand, 
monetary policy was used to increase both the employment, 
especially in the Army, and raise salaries to encourage 
government employees to continue supporting the regime. But, 
regrettably, such efforts while futile were not benign towards 
the Afghan nation. The salaries of civil employees, for 
instance, were far below the salaries of the military militia 
who were fighting against Mujahideen.
The Soviet installed government increased employment in
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war related sectors. Militia bases, revolutionary guards, and 
state security forces were established to defend the regime 
and were financed by the government budget. The regime, 
therefore, printed over supply of money to finance the war. 
The following table gives the amount of money supply in 
Afghanistan for the years 1987-89.
Table 3-4: Money Supply(million Afghanis at 21 Dec.)
1987 1988 1989
Currency outside banks 112,488 152,330 222,720
Private Sector 9,564 12,693 12,838
Deposits at Bank of
Afghanistan
Demand Deposit at 5,642 9,531 n.a.
commercial Banks
Source: IMF, International Finance Statistics, Europe Year
Book p. 287.
The figures in table seems doubtful because the regime, 
in order to show its stability, has tried to announce 
considerably lower amounts of money in circulation in 
Afghanistan bazaars. Despite the government's vain effort to 
keep the real picture of the economy a secret, the figures 
shown in table indicate about 50 percent increase in money 
supply within three years during the war. The annual rate of 
inflation for the years 1983 and 1984 was in the range of 16 
to 20 percent and prices for the years 1980-84 increased by 80 
to 100 percent. The Afghanistan currency "Afghani” lost much 
of its value throughout the war period. In 1978, for example,
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five Afghani was exchanged against one Pakistani rupee, while 
in 1991 almost 37 Afghani was exchanged against one Pakistani 
rupee. According to Dr. Abdul Qahar Samin, the inflation rate 
in Afghanistan is estimated at 500 percent. This rate had 
severely affected the real price of commodities in the way 
that real prices are believed to have risen by one-sixth of 
nominal price increase. A comparison of prices for some 
widely used consumer items between 1978 and 1990 are given in 
table 3-5,6,7,8.
These tables indicate that there has been a dramatic price 
hike in different locations of the country. The conditions in 
provinces not mentioned could be increasingly worse.
Table 3-5: Mutton & Beef prices per kg in major cities.
Location 1987 1990 %increase
Mtn Beef Mtn Beef Mtn Beef
Kabul city 80 50 1200 900 1400 1400
Kunarha
Province
75 50 1250 900 1567 1700
Ghazni
Province
75 50 1250 900 828 700
Nangarhar
Province
80 45 1200 800 1400 1678
Baghlan
Province
70 40 1100 1000 1471 2400
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Table 3-7: Prices of Sugar and Black Tea per kg.
Location 1978 1990 %increase
Sugar Tea Sugar Tea Sugar Tea
Kabul city 25 100 400 2600 1500 2500
Kunarha 30 120 375 2700 1150 2150
Ghazni 27 100 330 1450 1122 1350
Nangarhar 30 100 400 2000 1233 1900
Baghlan 25 110 400 2700 1500 2355
Table 3-8: Prices of Edible Oil and Onion per 7kg.
Location 1978 1990 %increase
Oil Onion Oil Onion Oil Onion
Kabul city 500 20 3000 500 500 2400
Kunarha 550 30 8800 260 1500 767
Ghazni 550 25 3500 630 536 2420
Nangarhar 500 - 2800 - 460 -
Baghlan 500 4 3300 130 550 3150
Source: WUFA V.6 #2 March-April 1991.
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Foreign Trade
Trade plays a vital role in Afghan economy as most of 
middle class capitalists of the country were involved in 
trade. Afghanistan imports most essential consumer products 
and exports mostly agricultural products and raw materials. An 
appropriate trade policy is therefore significantly important 
for economic well being of the nation. The international 
trade theory implies that countries with different level of 
endowments gain from trade. David Ricardo writes, Ma nation, 
like a person, gains from trade by exporting the goods or 
services in which it has greatest comparative advantage in 
productivity and importing in which it has the least 
comparative advantage."4
Afghanistan is heavily endowed with natural resources and 
various kinds of raw materials needed in industrial 
production. It is cheaper for Afghanistan to buy industrial 
products from abroad than it is to produce them inside the 
country. Afghan natural resources such as oil and gas, 
mineral such as lapis lazuli, copper, coal, iron ore etc. can 
be shipped to the rest of the world in exchange for industrial 
products. The country was exporting a large amount of 
agricultural goods such as Karakul skins(Persian lamb), 
cotton, fresh and dried fruit, animal fur, etc. Afghan 
handicrafts were also good exportable for the country. The 
Afghan rugs were exported to foreign markets at competitive 
prices. According to classical trade theory, Afghanistan
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should specialize in the production of the some of above 
mentioned goods, especially rugs, cotton, wools, and Karakul.
However, Afghanistan may not extract a larger share of 
advantage from trade because of its dependence on foreign 
imports, but nevertheless, it benefits in terms of 
transferring capital and modern technology into its society. 
Gillis writes, "Developing countries are in a position to 
learn from the experience of already advanced nations. The 
most obvious area in which these advantages exist in the realm 
of science and technology."5 In Afghanistan the larger exports 
and imports were made with the Soviet Union at a price far 
below the international market. The Afghan exportable could 
bring in a considerable amount of hard currency to its economy 
if shipped to Pakistan or other foreign markets. Nonetheless, 
trade with the former Soviet Union was a good policy if it was 
made at a fair price because of the low transportation cost. 
The country could also get its needed consumer products at a 
cheaper price.
The Afghanistan government significantly controlled 
foreign trade. Foreign sales of Afghan traditional exportable 
goods such as wool, cotton, skins, rugs, and dried fruit were 
subject to the state's control. The governmental involvement 
in agricultural exportable improved cotton exports. The 
Afghan government under Doud leadership put a new regulation 
on private sector import and export operations which increased 
the country's exports by 149 percent between 1973-77.
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However, Afghanistan traditionally was experiencing a large 
trade deficit because the value of imports always exceeded the 
value of exports. The gap was, nevertheless, filled by the 
remittances from workers from abroad, tourists, and foreign 
aid. A yawning trade deficit has been inherited from the 
Soviet installed regime. During the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, the deficit dramatically increased each year. In 
1983, for instance, total exports were valued at $670 million 
while total imports were valued at $880 million which leaves 
a gap of $ (-120) million. Exports of some goods of vital 
importance increased tremendously during the war period. 
Afghan natural gas exports, for example, accounted for 40 
percent of the country1s total exports in 1981. Two years 
later, in 1983, Afghan natural gas exports to the former USSR 
accounted for 80 percent of the nation's total exports. Other 
major exportable in the country were fruit, nuts, 
Karakul(Persian lamb fur), skins, rugs, wool, and cotton. 
Table 3-9 shows the exportable items for the years 1981-90.
Afghanistan's major trade partners before 1978 were the 
USSR, Iran, Pakistan, Germany, England, India, Hong kong, 
Japan, and the USA. The USSR enjoyed a larger share of 
Afghanistan's foreign trade prior to the war which accounted 
for 37 percent of the nation's total export and 23 percent of 
its imports. This share dramatically increased after the 
Soviets' military invasion. In 1983, for example, the share 
of the former USSR accounted for 58 percent of Afghanistan's
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export and 65 percent of its imports.'
Table 3-9: Afghan exportable items (US $ 000) for the years 
1981-1990.








169,478 174,933 191,971 - - - -
Hides & 
Skins
14,491 11,711 15,547 - - _ -
Karakul 33,299 18,845 9,592 5,700 10,500 8, 300 6,100
Oil
seeds
6, 412 2, 031 3, 888 - _ -
Wool 12,308 23,364 25,380 24,500 14,600 3,800 30, 90 
0
Cotton 36,650 22,566 10.175 19,200 9, 800 8, 900 12, 30 
0



















43,551 28,901 30,155 45,100 83,000 108,900 59,20
0
Total 705,244 694,292 728,579 556,800 551,900 511,900 432,7
00
Source: Europa Yearbook, IMF.
Table 3-10 shows the total export and imports of the 
country for the years 1980-90.
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Table 3“10i Imports and Exports for the years 1980=90(US $000)
1980/8 1981/8 1983/8 1985/8 1986/8 1987/8 1988/8 1990
1 2 4 6 7 8 9
EXPORTS 705,24 694,29 728,57 556,80 551,90 511,90 432,70 235,
4 2 9 0 0 0 0 900
IMPORTS 551,74 622,41 846.02 1,194, 1,403, 995,90 900,30 821,
6 6 2 200 500 0 0 700
DIFFER. 153,49 71,876 _ _
6 117,44 637,40 851,60 484,00 467,60 585,
3 0 0 0 0 800
Source: Europa YearBook? IMF^ International Financial
Statistics.
Tables 3-11 and 3-12 give a list of principle trading 
partners and the amount of export/import in(US $000) for the 
years 1980-84. The tables indicate that, as a whole, the 
imports of the country have increased during the war period; 
whereas, the exports have been declining.
Table 3-11: Import Partners(US $000)
Imports 1980/81 1981/82 1983/84
Germany(FDRG) 16 f959 16,779 17,076
Hong Kong 18,586 27,386 na.
India 20,572 17,029 28,985
Japan 98,207 76,670 111,061
Pakistan 14,895 11,737 14,882
USSR 290,496 365,000 526,319
USA 14,216 7,156 8,721
Total(including 
others)
551,748 622, 416 846.022
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Table 3”12z Export Partners(US $Ouu)
Exports 1980/81 1981/82 1983/84
Czechoslovakia 14,585 12,088 4,838
Germany(FRG) 51,513 41,801 26,130
India 54,513 43,212 84,212
Pakistan 52,101 61,249 11,080
Saudi Arabia 21,188 19,214 na.
USSR 417,872 412,635 400,756









1982 was not available.
Some widely used consumer products such as Japanese radios, 
tape recorders, watches, and other electronic items are 
imported to Afghanistan by private traders. Since the state 
owned banks of Afghanistan did not provide foreign currencies 
to buy such items the Kabul money bazaars were allowed to 
provide the needed currencies at a freely fluctuating exchange 
rate.
Furthermore, black market activities play an important 
role in Afghanistan money bazaars. In 1958 the unofficial 
transactions were officially recognized as bazaars free 
market. Most of the transactions of the foreign currencies 
took place in Kabul because the air traffic to foreign 
countries passed through this city. The bazaars were so 
effective that Afghanistan became a leading Asian center for 
trading bank notes. An estimated amount of Af6-7 billion
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together with 60 percent of the country's foreign trade and 
almost all non trade transactions were made in this sector.
Smuggling was another feature of the Afghan economy. For 
the most part, Japanese consumer products were being smuggled 
into Pakistan via Afghan borders. Underground activities 
comprised the larger share of the nation1s trade activities 
because there wasn't any book-keeping for such activities. A 
considerable amount of opium and narcotic drugs were being 
produced and traded in provinces on the border of Pakistan, 
especially in tribal areas. The best way to stop the supply 
of narcotic drugs was for the governments of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan to issue a joint statement which would eliminate the 
tribal system in both countries. This would have enabled the 
two countries to enforce law and order in the region, thus 
stopping production and consumption of illegal drugs.
Education
Education is, of course, an investment in human capital 
which improves the labor quality and provides technical 
professionals as well as personnel desperately needed in 
various fields of the economy. Gillis is of the opinion that, 
"education and income are highly correlated at both 
individual and social level."1 This idea implies that the 
higher the literacy rate the better the economic condition and 
the higher the education the higher the income level. 
Education is therefore highly demanded in both developing and
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developed countries, and a larger portion of their budget is 
spent on it. In the broad sense, education is defined in 
three ways: (1) Formal education which takes place in
organized schools, colleges and universities; (2) Non-Formal 
education, organized learning programs outside of schools. 
This type of learning is short, but it is applied to real 
life. Teaching in literacy schools, family life, or some 
professional skills can be the examples of non-formal 
education; (3) Informal education or unorganized programs of 
learning outside schools is learning from experiences at 
home, in jobs, or society in general. All three forms of 
education had existed in Afghan society; however, the formal 
education was so indubitably meager in the pre-war era that 
kept the country amongst those nations with the lowest 
literacy rates.
Parents in rural areas could hardly expect to send their 
children to schools because they were needed to help on the 
farms and the parents didn't understand the importance of 
education. There was a significant inequality among regions 
and social classes that characterized Afghanistan's schooling 
system. In Afghanistan, a child who lived in major cities or 
came from a good socio-economic background could easily have 
received high-quality schooling compared to those children 
from villages or those with poor socio-economic backgrounds. 
Obviously, discrimination between different parts of the 
country was observed.
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The governments prior to communists takeover were mostly 
dominated by the Pashtuns of tribal areas. The military
schools which were in high demand had a considerably higher
number of students from southern and eastern provinces such as 
Paktiya, Jalalabad and Kunarha compared to the number -of 
students from northern and western provinces of the country. 
Furthermore, bribery and influences played a major role in 
obtaining admission to certain schools, especially Kabul 
Universityo Some economists are of the opinion that a better 
distribution of schools would lead to a more equal
distribution of income. The present Islamic State of
Afghanistan is, therefore, responsible to consider the 
desperate needs of the Afghan nation for adequate and equal 
educational opportunities without discrimination. A better 
schooling system and an improved level of education would help 
people of different socio-economic background and ethnic 
groups to become acquainted with one another and be able to 
live in peace and brotherhood.
Education can also have a significant impact on economic 
development of the country by providing well trained manpower 
and highly qualified professionals. It took a long time for 
the developing countries to figure out how important education 
is to economic development; hence, emphasizing improvement in 
the school systems. In Afghanistan six to eight years of 
schooling was compulsory and free, but not universal. Even in 
this case, ethnic discrimination and influences played a major
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role in the way that provinces of Pashtun nationality were 
given larger facilities and numbers of schools.
The schooling budget was not equally or appropriately 
distributed among different provinces of the country. 
Provinces such as Nangrahar and Paktya were provided with 
better facilities and larger financial capital, compared to 
the rest of the provinces. The reason could have been the 
presence of a larger number of Pashtuns running and 
supervising government offices. On the other hand, the 
emergence of intellectuals among oppressed nationalities were 
considered as "dead squash" to the Pashtun dominated 
government. This could be one of the main reasons that kept 
literacy so low in the country. The previous rulers, who were 
worried about their future, did not provide equal opportunity 
and appropriate schooling to every member of society. The 
present regime is expected to consider the previous mistakes 
and develop an educational plan that would provide every 
Afghan, regardless of his nationality, sex, origin, and color, 
with equal educational opportunities.
Economic analysis requires cost-benefit analysis in 
educational planning. This is due to the fact that in some 
countries the number of people possessing various kinds of 
academic training exceeds the number of jobs available; 
therefore, bringing about a large number of unemployed 
graduates. This would inevitably reduce the rate of return of 
schooling in such countries. This case does not hold true for
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a war-torn country such as Afghanistan, where almost all roots 
of educational infrastructure have been devastated. In 
Afghanistan, it is advisable to calculate the social rates of 
return or primary, secondary, and higher education. 
Vocational, academic, technical, and professional education 
should also be evaluated. When applying the cost-benefit 
analysis approach the first priorities should be focused on 
vocational and technical education, therefore, providing a 
framework for rebuilding the country. In this regard, I would 
prefer to emphasize providing opportunities that help acquire 
higher education in essential fields such as medicine, 
engineering, business, economics, and agriculture. Believing 
education to be an investment in human resources, justifies 
its contribution to the national income. For this very 
purpose we as economists have to look at its productivity, and 
the above mentioned fields of study will provide the most 
productive labor force and professional cadres for the Afghan 
economy.
Educational Status before 1978
The history of education in Afghanistan dates back to 
1870, during the reign of Amir Sher Ali Khan, but due to some 
social crises it was stopped after his death. Later, in 1904, 
under Amir Habibulah, the English type of middle schools were 
established in Kabul. Eventually, the schooling system began 
to flourish allowing for various schooling systems to be
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implemented. In 1S12, for example, the French schooling 
system was introduced and by 1919, after independence from 
Britain, modern education was expanded. Many friendly
countries such as France, Germany, Turkey, and Egypt helped 
Afghanistan to strengthen its educational system by offering 
scholarships to Afghan students in their countries. The 
countries also provided the government of Afghanistan with 
teachers for Afghan schools. Later, school systems were again 
disrupted and many schools were closed when a civil war broke 
out in 1929.
When pro-British King Nader took over, schools again 
started functioning inside the country. In 1931, a new
constitution was issued under which primary education was 
made compulsory, but not universal. In 1930 there were 13 
schools, 53 teachers, and 15,980 students enrolled, but this 
number increased to 324 schools, 1,990 teachers, and 60,000 
students by 1940. In the first five year plan (1956-61) more 
emphasis was made in sectors other than education.
Nevertheless, educational progress was outstanding when 
compared to the population increase. In 1977, just one year 
before the communist coup, a total of 977 thousand students 
were enrolled in 3,704 schools and were instructed by 385,00 
teachers.2
Informal schools called Madrassa had flourished parallel 
to formal schools. Such schools were organized by local
clerics, religious scholars, and were financed by local
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people. Various subjects such as theology, commentaries on 
the Koran, Hadith (tradition of prophet Muhammad), Greek 
Philosophyr Islamic Jurisprudence, and other religious 
subjects were taught in these schools. These schools were 
managed in traditional ways in grand mosques, or in the 
neighborhood of the mosques. Modern education, on the 
contrary, began with new buildings, new instructors, and were 
organized and financed by the government.
Under a new constitution, passed twenty three years ago, 
primary and secondary education was made compulsory and free 
for all citizens of the country, but due to lack of teachers 
and insufficient finances, the nation failed to make it 
universal. Some foreign countries such as United States, 
Britain, Germany, and the USSR helped Afghanistan by providing 
some professional instructors. Afghan instructors were 
provided professional training both in and out of the country. 
The educational status prior to the communist coup flourished 
significantly. For instance, in 1978 the number of students 
enrolled in various schools was said to be about one million 
in primary schools. Of this a large number could not complete 
their high school programs as a result of intensive warfare. 
There were 133,000 students enrolled in secondary schools and 
21,000 in higher education. The majority of students in 
secondary and higher education programs left their studies 
incomplete, while a considerable number of them were executed 
without any trial. In 1978 about 17 percent of the national
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budget was allocated to education.3
Higher education in Afghanistan began with the 
establishment of Kabul University in 1946 which is the 
country's largest and highest accredited university. However, 
some of its faculties were functioning separately in various 
parts of Kabul and were controlled by Ministry of Education. 
In 1965, Nangarhar University was established in the east and 
then the Institute of Polytechnic was established in 1967 with 
grants received from the former Soviet Union. In 1957, 
separate faculties of medicine, science, and letters were 
established for women. In 1961, co-education was adopted at 
Kabul University. Today, with the revival of a strong Islamic 
movement, the present state may segregate the co-educational 
schools in order to make it acceptable for the Afghan nation 
because most of Afghans are reluctant to send their daughters 
to the co-ed schools.
Educational Status After 1978
After the 1978 coup, the Afghan educational system 
suffered tremendously because of the Soviets ideological war. 
Afghan schools and universities were the main targets. New 
text books and new methods were introduced. Many Islamic 
courses were dropped from the schools' curricula and courses 
related to socialism were introduced instead. Professor 
Hamidullah Amin writes, "the loss is beyond recovery in short 
span of time. Education was the first target of the
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communists. Thus the changes in the quantity and quality of 
education during this period is very remarkable."4 With the 
military invasion of the Soviets, many Afghans were forced to 
flee the country, or to seek refuge in areas under the control 
of a resistance power. This resulted in significant decline 
in the number of students enrolled in Afghan schools.
Despite a significant decrease in number of students in 
Afghanistan schools, the communist regime released dubious 
statistics in 1986. The regime claimed that a total of 
700,554 students were acquiring knowledge in 1,226 schools, 
and a total of 22,129 teachers were employed in these schools. 
In this regard Hamidullah Amin writes, "According to an 
estimate the number of students under the jurisdiction of the 
Kabul government cannot be more than 400,000 studying in 
about 350 schools and taught by about 20,000 teachers."5 The 
actual figure, though not available, may be far below this 
estimate. This is because about 80 percent of rural areas 
were controlled by the resistance powers, and these schools 
were closed down as a result of severe warfare, lack of 
financial assistance and teaching materials. Besides, 
thousands of high school and college students were either 
executed or imprisoned by communist tyrants or fled the 
country to save their lives. Many school buildings were 
either set on fire or destroyed by both the Soviets and 
resistance forces. In rural regions, as the war intensified 
and the resistance got more strength the Soviets turned school
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buildings into military bases. The Mujahids, in order to 
destroy the Russian shelters, had no option but to destroy the 
school buildings. The Mujahids, however, did rebuild some of 
the ruined buildings after the Soviet withdrawal. 
Unfortunately, the damage sustained by this sector is beyond 
the ability of the Afghan regime to rebuild without foreign 
assistance.
In 1983, just three years after the communist coup, the 
Soviet installed prime minister, Kishtmand, admitted that 50 
percent of the country's 4,000 schools had been destroyed. 
Later, in June of the same year, the regime's defence minister 
Abdul Qadeer admitted that 2,000 schools "had been turned into 
rubble". As far as attendance is concerned, the number of 
students in Kabul schools was 10 percent of pre-1978 level. 
Almost 78 percent of the nation's educational institutions had 
been destroyed. Table 3-13 shows the statistics for
destruction that had occurred to Afghan schools until 1984.
Table 3-13: No. of Schools in Afghanistan in 1978 and 1984.
Type of Schools 1978 1984 %Decline
High Schools 163 44 73%
Middle Schools 350 78 78%
Primary Schools 1154 210 82%












The data in the table, however, do not reflect the real 
estimation of the loss. The major destruction to the Afghan 
educational sector occurred after 1984. The present 
government, as well as the nation's political parties, are 
expected to reach an agreement to establish a standardized 
curriculum for schools distributed fairly all over the 
country.
Nonetheless, the government of Pakistan's Commissionarate 
for Afghan Refugees with the help of international 
humanitarian circles established a considerable number of 
schools in refugee camps. Afghan Resistance Parties also 
opened schools for Afghan refugees outside the country. By 
1990, the number of schools operating under the Afghan 
Commissionarate in Pakistan was 622 in NWFP and 154 in 
Baluchistan, with 111,316 and 16,739 students respectively. 
It was also claimed that 3,123 teachers in NWFP and 484 
teachers in Baluchistan were employed. Resistance political 
parties operated 866 schools consisting of 10,557 teachers for 
178,699 students. After the Soviets withdrew, some qualified 
and educated Mujahid commanders established some schools in 
areas under their control. An estimated 200,000 to 250,000 
students were studying in various schools financed by foreign 
agencies.
Higher education is one of the main sectors that has 
fallen as a casualty of war. This sector has suffered from 
the lack of both quality and quantity. Before the communist
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take over, the enrollment in various faculties was based on a 
highly competitive entrance test. As a result, qualified 
students could enter good faculties. But regrettably, after 
the coup, political affiliation played a large role in 
university enrollment. Likewise, the university candidates 
were previously accepted by passing an entrance test while 
after the coup appointments were made on the basis of party 
affiliation or relation to some high ranking party members. 
This, in fact, tremendously reduced the quality of education 
in Afghanistan universities. Professor Amin writes, "The 
rules and regulations of the university weren't observed. In 
the beginning even those taking part in the fighting for a 
three months period were taken into higher class as with out 
passing any exam. One third of all new comers to the 
university were party members. They were exempt from taking 
the entrance exam compulsory for all in the past."6
Transportation
Transportation, of course, plays a vital role in economic 
development of a society as it connects the rural parts of the 
country to cities, and builds an economic, social, and 
cultural relationship among various nations. In Afghanistan, 
the improvement of the transportation system seems to be a 
necessary condition for industrial progress. About 85 percent 
of Afghanistan's population lives in rural areas and much raw 
materials needed for industries are produced there.
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Likewise, labor is easily available at a considerably low 
price in rural areas.
Afghanistan, for several times, attempted to build a 
strong transportation system. The nation does not have a rail 
road network. All internal transportation are done by trucks 
which is very expensive. Afghanistan does not possess a 
strong road or highway system either. A total of 17,000 km 
roads, including rough and paved, exist in Afghanistan. Of 
this 2560 km are highways that connect major provinces of the 
country to Kabul, and links Afghanistan with neighboring 
countries (NWFP Pakistan via Turkham-J a1a1abad, Chaman, 
Pakistan through Qandahar, and Islam Qala with Iran via 
Herat) . In the first five year plan (formulated in 1955) , 
much emphasis was placed on construction of a good 
transportation system. Meanwhile the country received a $100 
million loan package from the former USSR in order to finance 
its major development infrastructure, including the Solang 
Tunnel (the highway that connected Kabul with the Soviet 
border in the north).
The second five year plan(1962-67) had also emphasized 
the improvement of transportation, communication, and 
infrastructure. The total cost of the plan was 44.5 billion 
Afghanis, of which 80 percent was covered by foreign 
assistance. However, later on due to unavailability of 
appropriate aid, especially from the USA and the former USSR, 
to implement the project, the expenditure was reduced to 27
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billion Afghanis.1
In 1961 Afghanistan started the construction of a 300 
miles(483km) highway that connects Kabul with Qandahar. This 
road was completed in October 1966 at a total cost of 
$44,640,959 covered by USAID and Af163,540,000 covered by 
Afghanistan's budget. In August, 1966, the country had begun 
the construction of a 77 mile (123km) highway that connected 
Kabul to Herat on Iranian border. The project was completed 
in 1967 at a total cost of $10,230,000, of which $9,353,290 
was covered by US assistance. This road benefited the Afghan 
economy because it linked the country with Iran in the west, 
and connected it with the north-south Russian built road in 
the northern Afghanistan. The Qandahar-Herat-Turghundi 
highway, with a length of 425 miles (680km), was built with 
the help of the former Soviet Union. The Russians also helped 
Afghanistan in construction of 140 miles(224km) of the Kabul- 
Turkham highway, 48 miles (77km) of the Kabul-Jabaluseraj 
highway, and 133.5 miles (214km) of the Dushi-Sher Khan Bander 
highway.2
The Doushi-Jabaluseraj Road was built at a total cost of 
$638 million financed by the former USSR. The construction 
work was started in 1958 and completed in 1964. This included 
construction of a 1.71 miles(2.7 km) long, 17 feet in height, 
and a 25 foot wide tunnel with 4.5 mile long Galleries. The 
construction of this tunnel eliminated a total distance of 126 
miles (200.12km) cutting Hindukush mountains and several miles
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of the previous round about route from Kabul to the former 
Soviet border.3
In 1977 the Daoud regime planned to create a railway 
system that would connect Afghanistan to its neighboring 
countries. The proposed rail way line of some 1,815km was 
intended to link Afghanistan with Iran State Railways at Islam 
Qala, and with Pakistan Railways at Chaman, Baluchistan 
Province and at Turkhum, NWFP. The work on the railway 
project never begun because of the communist coup and 
subsequent war. Afghanistan started the construction of a 
combined road and rail bridge across the Amu Darya (Oxus 
River) during the President Daud era. This was completed in 
1982 with the Soviet assistance. This bridge has a 
significant impact on the Afghan economy as it connects the 
Afghan port of Hairatan with the former Soviet, and now 
Uzbekistan port of Termez. The plans to build a 200 km 
railway line from Hairatan to the Baghlan province in the 
north have not yet begun.
About five major transport companies are active in 
Afghanistan. The major Afghan transport companies are the 
following: The Land Transport Company founded in 1943, the 
Afghan International Transport Company at Kabul, the Afghan 
Container Transport Company Ltd. at Kabul, the Afghan Transit 
Company at Kabul, and the Mili Bus Enterprise at Kabul. The 
number of passenger cars and commercial vehicles are given in 
the following table.
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Table 3-142 Road Traffic (Motor Vehicles in use)
1979/80 1980/81 1981/82
Passenger Cars 34,192 34, 080 34,908
Commercial 27,55 28,714 30,800
Vehicles
Source: Europa YearBook P. 288.
The numbers in the table doesn't reflect the real picture 
because many Afghan passenger cars and commercial vehicles 
have been destroyed since then. Many commercial vehicles were 
taken to Pakistan where they were sold by their owners to 
cover their living expenses. Many private trucks were 
destroyed by bombs or destroyed by USSR military action.
Moreover, while undertaking development projects much 
priority was given to their political benefits than to 
economic importance. In a poor country such as Afghanistan, 
where people could hardly manage to survive and feed their 
dependents, the construction of the Solang Tunnel should have 
not been given priority in initial steps of development 
process. The majority of Afghan population was living in 
rural regions and they could hardly reach the provinces' 
capitals to buy merchandize. They used pack animals for 
transportation, which was expensive both in terms of time and 
maintenance costs. The government planners did not calculate 
the social cost and benefit of the projects to be undertaken. 
In fact, the former USSR had a considerable influence in 
implementing those projects which proved to be worthwhile for
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Russians during their invasion.
Despite the deficiencies of the previous government's 
plans, Afghanistan, nevertheless, made good progress in road 
construction prior to the communist coup. But the brutal 
warfare that still threatens the stability of the country has 
caused tremendous damage to the transportation and 
communication infrastructure, especially the road networks. 
According to UN estimates, about 70 percent of the nation's 
roads and highways have been destroyed. The resistance 
sources claim that almost 80 percent of the country's 
transportation infrastructure have been destroyed or severely 
damaged by Soviet tanks and air raids. For example the Solang 
Tunnel incurred major destruction as Soviet tanks and 
artilleries used it daily during the decade long war. Also 
tough winter conditions in Afghanistan, and poor maintenance 
services, have severely deteriorated the tunnel safety. 
Seasonal snow melting has also caused many cracks in the 
tunnel walls.
Civil Aviation
There are two international airports and 30 other local 
airports in Afghanistan. The two international airports are 
located at Kabul, the capital of the country, and at the 
Qandahar province. The country had two main airlines, the 
Ariana Airline and the Bakhter Airline, both located in Kabul. 
International services were provided by Ariana Airline while
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Bakhter Airline was engaged in domestic services. In 1985, 
Ariana Airline was merged with Bakhter Afghan Airline Co. Ltd. 
Domestic services between Kabul and 18 other provinces and 
interneticr.s. 1 services to the USSR, Czechoslovakia, India, and 
the UAE had continued throughout the war years.
The Kabul international airport, as well as Shendand 
military airport near Herat, have been severely damaged as a 
result of the civil war that broke out between the Islamic 
State of Afghanistan and the dissident Hekmatyar group. It is 
claimed that damages caused by Hekmatyr1s rockets to the two 
principal airports could be estimated in millions of US 
dollars.
Communications and Media
Afghan communications and media have been severely 
damaged by the war. In 1979-80 there were 23,680 telephones 
in use. In 1986, Radio receivers in use were estimated at 
1.5m, and TV receivers were estimated at 115,000. Color TV 
broadcasting was introduced to Afghanistan in 1978 with a 
transmission range of 50km. In 1980, the Soviets established 
new radio stations in major cities such as Qandahar, Herat, 
Jalalabad, Ghazni, and Assadabad. The installations were made 
on the insistence of the Kabul regime, hoping to expand its 
propaganda beyond Afghan borders. They also intended to 
establish some radio stations in the Paktya, Farah, and 
Badakhshan provinces.
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The telephone system of the country was seriously damaged 
by the war and much of the government communications were made 
by wireless devices and telexes. Telephone systems in the 
rural areas and small towns have been destroyed by war. The 
main radio and TV stations in Kabul were severely damaged by 
military conflicts between rival groups of Mujahideen. This 
self-destructive conflict is very unfortunate and sensless. 
It is hoped that the Afghan political parties will rely on 
negotiations to resolve their political problems, not weapons. 
The nation has had enough war, and it is time that every 
Afghan unite to rebuild their country.
Health and Social Welfare
In 1982 there were 68 hospitals with 4,837 beds and 1,160 
physicians. Health Services were free for Afghan citizens, 
and hospitals were financed from the government budget. 
However, there were so few health centers that it was 
difficult to handle the nation's health problems. In 
addition, facilities and sophisticated instruments available 
to Afghan physicians were trivial compared to the requirements 
of a modern health center.
Fourteen years of devastating warfare severely damaged 
Afghan hospitals. Many local clinics and health centers have 
also been closed down as a result of the war. The life 
expectancy is, therefore, the lowest in Asia. The estimated 
average life expectancy in 1970 was 38, and has fallen by at
58
least two years since then. According to UK estimates, 
between 1980-85 Afghanistan had the highest rate of infant 
mortality in Asia. The death rate was estimated at 194 deaths 
per 1,000 children under 12 months old.
In 1988, communist government officials assessed the 
total number of both medical centers and hospitals at 196, and 
physicians at 1,931. But these numbers, if true, were in 
major cities under the regime's control. The rural areas and 
the regions beyond the regime1s control had suffered severely 
from the lack of medical facilities. Later though, some 
international humanitarian circles did help Afghans in these 
areas, and established some small health centers in provinces 
closer to Pakistan. However, these centers could not offer 
any services beyond first aid treatment.
The present Islamic State of Afghanistan is expected to 
reestablish medical centers in rural areas and small towns, as 
the majority of Afghans live in these areas. It would not be 
advisable for the Afghan government to start building large 
and highly sophisticated hospitals, at least in the short 
term, because the cost would exceed its social benefits in 
Afghan society. Medical centers should be located through out 
the country so as to provide residents with appropriate 
medical treatments. The construction of large hospitals and 
research centers equipped with modern facilities can be a part 
of long-term plan of the country.
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In this section of my paper I would like to discuss the 
industrial policy implemented by previous regimes and, to some 
extent, to shed light on the effects of a decade long bloody 
war brought about by the Soviet empire.
The concept of industrialization has been the core of 
major discussion among development economists since the 
emergence of the Industrial Revolution in the western world as 
it increased the per-capita incomes of industrial countries.
According to development theory, larger shares of GNP 
brought about by industrial products are closely associated 
with increasing income per-capita. Industrialization indeed 
is attained with the process of urbanization, which creates 
other problems for major cities in backward countries.
Much of the population, for example, in order to find a 
prosperous life, moves to large cities where they could find 
higher paid jobs in various industries. Moreover, in major 
cities, workers can easily find living facilities such as 
housing, transportation, etc. so the firms and industries do 
not have to provide it while in rural areas they have to incur 
such costs. Besides infrastructure such as: industries,
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electricity, water supply, roads, schools, and in some cases 
even housing complexes are provided by the government. 
Industries and firms are, therefore, highly concentrated in 
main cities if; Afghanistan where the living standard is 
completely different from that of rural areas.
The government of Afghanistan, in order to encourage 
domestic middle class capitalists to invest their money in 
rural areas, has to build roads, railroads, and housing 
complexes. They must also establish transportation industries 
to carry the resultant products to domestic and foreign 
markets at low cost. Only then will domestic 
entrepreneurs go ahead and undertake some industrial projects 
that would bring a satisfactory return on their investment.
As we observe in various underdeveloped countries, 
urbanization has huge costs such as: overcrowding, pollution,
unsanitary conditions, displacement, village migration, higher 
crime rate, etc. According to development theory, large scale 
investment is good if costs are kept low and production and 
benefits high. But in a poor country like Afghanistan, large 
scale investment proved to be less profitable. The reason 
might have been the government's monopoly over large and heavy 
industries, lack of proper management, corrupt administration, 
and ill-planning. The employees, for instance, were eager to 
spend most of their time gossiping and relaxing because their 
salaries and jobs were, to some extent, guaranteed.
62
The industrial policy adopted by previous governments 
prior to the April 1978 coup was not attractive enough to high 
and middle class domestic capitalists. Because they were 
accustomed to dealing with relatively small scale businesses 
that require high rates of return. Normally economies of 
scale requires large scale plants and industries, but in a 
country like Afghanistan small and medium scale industries 
have proved to be competitive.
Many widely used manufactured commodities such as, 
textiles, clothing, footwear, furniture, cement, bricks, 
plastic goods, and other products were produced by small 
industries in Afghanistan. However, due to a system of low 
tariffs and easy import laws, Afghan industries failed to 
compete with the foreign imports as the same products were 
easily available in bazaars at lower prices and better 
quality. However, the Afghan government, made several 
attempts to structure its tariff system in a way that could 
help protect domestic industries and hence increase private 
investment inside the country. In 1974, for instance, a 
Foreign and Domestic Private Investment Law was approved under 
which a maximum rate of 20 percent import tariff would be 
levied on raw as well as semi-finished goods. Only those 
industrial enterprises, built after the new Investment Law, 
were affected by this tariff policy. While older industrial 
firms were allowed to enjoy the use of nominal low tariff 
rates ranging from 5-20 percent on material inputs.
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In earlier stages of industrial development in 
Afghanistan major attempts were made to establish state owned 
industries. This pushed private investors back to trade 
related businesses. State as well as private owned
industries v@rs quite weak jrior to communist take-over in 
1978, whereas after the coup business condition deteriorated 
severelye The new communist regime had intended to 
nationalise all private industries, but with the emergence of 
a strong nationwide resistance such ominous intention was 
thwarted. The perplexing war in Afghanistan has badly 
affected this sector of the economy. A large number of 
employees fled the country or joined resistance groups and 
thus shared the holy war against foreign invaders. Many of 
the remaining workers were forced to carry arms to defend the 
so-called "Revolution”. While many others, those who rejected 
participating in war against their brethren, were taken to 
jails where they were severely tortured and then executed on 
the charge of being counter-revolutionary. As a result, 
industries ran short of labor and production declined 
tremendously.
Despite the clear cut facts that indicate a huge 
reduction in industrial production in Afghanistan, the 
communist regime claims a rate of increase and improvement in 
this sector. The regime claimed a 3.5 percent increase in 
industrial output for 1987. The regime further claimed that 
industrial output from mining, manufacturing, construction,
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and power contributed an estimated 21.i percent to total GNP 
in 1986/87.1 About 10.9 percent of the country's settled 
labor force were employed in the manufacturing sector in 1979; 
this number had largely been reduced throughout the war era, 
but the exact number has not been released.
History of Afghan Industrial Development
For a long time Afghan leaders dreamed of modernization 
and industrialization. The history of industrialization goes 
back to the reign of Amir Sher Ali Khan (1869-1879) , with the 
establishment of a small scale gun and artillery industry. 
Later, in the era of Amir Abdul Rahman Khan(1880-1901), and 
his son Amir Habibullah Khan(1901-1919), several industries 
such as arms manufacturing, boot-making, coin-minting, 
leather, and textiles had been established.2 After its 
independence from Britain, the country had established several 
factories such as the match and the printing industries. 
Nevertheless, Amir Amanullah (1919-1929) made some futile 
efforts to expand the industrial sector of the economy, but 
the national socio-political crises and prevailing instability 
doomed his efforts to failure. Lack of sufficient managerial 
personnel who were capable of running modern imported 
machineries barred the way to industrial progress.
Prime minister Daoud (1953-1963) and later President 
Daoud (1973-1978) influenced by socialist economic policies 
supported the public rather than the private sector. He
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insisted on building up state owned and government controlled 
industries financed by loans and grants received from abroad. 
There loans and grants came mostly from the USSR and its 
allies, as -. sll as, to some extent, the U.S.A. and World Bank, 
and other western countries. Although about fifty state 
controlled enterprises were established during President Daoud 
era, none brought satisfactory monetary returns. The reason 
for this was that most factories were functioning 60 to 70 
percent below their capacity. The reason for this according 
to Maxwel Fry, an American expert, was the state9s inability 
to mobilize an agricultural surplus and attain self- 
sufficiency in food stuffs.
Despite the Afghan government's various attempts to boost 
industrial activities, this sector regrettably accounted for 
only a small portion of the economic activity in the country. 
In 1977/78 industrial sector accounted for 17 percent of total 
GNP and employed an estimated labor force of 40,000.
The government provided subsidies and sold state land in 
order to encourage private trade and investment. With the 
establishment of the state owned National Bank of Afghanistan, 
most of the industrial establishments were monopolized by this 
bank. The major state controlled industries were cotton and 
woolen textiles, ceramics, sugar beets, soup, matches, canning 
plants, tanneries, and a metal foundry.3
Since the state monopolized all large and heavy 
industries, the private investors and entrepreneurs
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concentrated their investment in consumption fields of the 
economy. Table 4-1 provides a list of private industries as 
of 1967 in Afghanistan.4
Table 4-1: Private Industries in Afghanistan, 1967
Type of Industry No. of No. of
Industry Workers
Food Industry 14 657
Raisin Processing, Rose 
Essence, Casings, meat
Light Industry 20 2,467
Textiles








Source: Emadi, State. Revolution and Superpowers in
Afghanistan. 1990.
The number of private industries increased considerably in 
late 1970s, but with the onset of Communist coup attempt in 
1978 and with the subsequent Soviet invasion in 1979, the bulk 
of industries either stopped functioning or were functioning 
in poor condition.
The introduction of industries in Afghanistan resulted in 
a tremendous increase in the number of workers participating 
in the labor force. By 1966, about 21,470 workers were 
employed in 85 industrial complexes.5 Indeed, the best way to
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achieve economic growth and progressive development is to 
increase the total output in a way that benefits the lower 
classes in society. The total output in a war-torn country 
such as Afghanistan where almost all forms of infrastructure, 
agriculture, &»£ industrial projects are completely 
devastated, can be raised through the improvement of agri- 
industrial sector.
The present condition prevailing in Afghanistan requires 
an immediate and intensive care in small scale investment and 
light industries which would bring about high amount of 
consumer products to the economy. It might be advisable to 
undertake such projects through private investment which, of 
course, is difficult in Afghanistan.
Table 4-2 lists State as well as private industries and 
their working condition as of 1985. Table 4-2 shows major 
Textile plants functioning in Afghanistan until 1985. Table
4-3 gives us the list of all industrial plants prior to 
1964,their location, number of employees, and their situation 
as of 1980-85. The following tables show that the industrial 
sector in Afghanistan has been badly affected by the 14 year 
of war. As a result of this destructive war, a score of 
industries in the country stopped functioning whereas the rest 
of them were functioning with difficulties. The employees of 
the affected industries had no option but either to comply 
with the regime's demands or take arms to defend the so called 
"revolution" or to leave the country in order to save their
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lives.
Table 4-2: Major Textile Plants.




















4. Balkh 1941 12 million 
meters
Out of order 





6. Herat 1938-41 10 million 
meters
Out of order 
due to lack of 
raw materials
* Source: General Geography of Afghanistan,1973,pp.33,36. The 
information about "situation” was released by Afghan 
Information Center.6
Anyway, the raw material needed came from rural areas and 
these areas were under the control of resistance forces. 
Because of this fact industries ran short of both labor and 
needed raw materials.
The industrial policies adopted by several previous 
governments in Afghanistan did not benefit the poor, as it was 
claimed, nor did they benefit the country in general. The 
government's monopoly over large and profitable industries 
weakened the process of rapid industrialization in
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Afghanistan. Most of industries established after the 
communist take over in 1978 were undertaken for military 
purposes.










4. Sculpture & 
Carpentry






7. Fruit Corp. 
Ltd.




































Out of order 
since 1981
Out of order 
in 1985
Out of order 
since 1979
Out of order 
in 1985




Table 4-4 shows the list of industrial plants established 
after 1964, their location, number of workers, and their 
situation as of 1980-85.
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Table 4-4: Industrial Plants Established After
No. Name







































































































































































Private investors were active only in trade and, to 
some extent, in the agricultural sector which required major 
monetary investments, in applying modern machinery, but 
generating a very low rate of return.
Moreover, the Communist coup in April 1978 and the 
subsequent Soviet invasion completely destroyed the industrial 
back-bone of the country. The new Islamic regime must take 
the deficiencies of the previous governments into
consideration and must adopt comprehensive and well organized 
plans that would benefit the country's economy. The regime 
should encourage its domestic middle class capitalists to 
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Agriculture plays a central role in the development 
process of Afghanistan because 85 percent of its population 
makes a living from the land and 72 percent of its labor force 
is engaged in agricultural activities. The improvement and 
productivity of this sector is required to improve the welfare 
of the majority by raising both the farmers' productivity in 
growing food and cash crops, and the price for those crops.
Productivity of agricultural land in a partly mountainous 
country like Afghanistan, can be significantly high provided 
it is well irrigated and well fertilized. The land1 s 
productivity is dependent on the introduction of appropriate 
technology and modern techniques. Some economists believe 
that agriculture is "the main source of capital in the early 
stages of development."1
This is the main sector that can make the country self- 
sufficient in food and hence keep it independent of direct or 
indirect foreign interventions. Moreover, if a country 
depends on other countries for food it would eventually come 
under that country's political and economic domination. 
Afghanistan, always dreaming of self-sufficiency, was to some
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extent relying on the Soviet's perilous food assistance that 
had finally brought it to the knees by the Soviets.
AGRICULTURAL CONDITION PRIER TO 1978
The government of Afghanistan under President Daoud1s 
leadership made efforts to improve agricultural output and 
land acreage in order to limit the extent of food dependency 
upon the Soviets. Geographically, the country is comprised of 
mountains, foothills, and deserts which makes it difficult to 
become self-sufficient in agriculture.
Agricultural activities are done in traditional and 
primitive ways. The land is plowed by oxen; the farming
equipment used include shovels, axes, sickles, etc. Only a
limited number of tractors and new technology was introduced 
before the war. The irrigation system was also quite poor and 
limited by the amount of water supplied from rivers, streams, 
wells, canals, and karezes. The total land area of 
Afghanistan is estimated at 65.2 million hectares of which 
about one quarter (16.3 million hectare) are potentially 
cultivable, but on the eve of 1978 Communist coup only about 
7.8 million was cultivated. About 2.6 million hectares of 
this amount is rain-fed and 5.2 million hectares is
irrigated.2
Due to the shortage of water supply and lack of
sufficient rainfall in the appropriate season, only about half 
of the arable land was cultivated annually. And only 1.4
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million hectares had sufficient water for double crops. 
According Dr. Azam Gul and Tom Morrison, the irrigated land 
could provide 77 percent of all wheat and 85 percent of all 
other food stuffs 3 The country's staple foods are wheat, 
maize, barely, and rice. The widely used vegetables are 
onions, tomatoes, potatoes, and oil seeds. Table 5-1 shows 
the cultivated area and production of crops as of 1978.4
Table 5-1: Cultivated Area and Crop Production in 1978
Crop Area (OOOha) Production (OOOton)




Other Cereals 43 35
Cotton 128 136





Other crops 77 413
Total 3,976
It should be noted that there is considerable controversy 
regarding the true amount of arable land available for farming 
in Afghanistan. Even different Afghan experts provide 
different information.
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Professor M. Q. Yusufi, for example, states: "The total 
geographical area of the country is 65.2626 million hectares, 
62.61 million of which is agricultural area. The arable land 
constitutes an area of 7.91 million hectares and 54.7 million 
hectares are permanent pastures and meadows. .. , only 2 . 5 to 2 . 6 
million hectares are actually irrigated in any given year."5
The third 5-year plan laid down by the Royal Government 
of Afghanistan put much emphasis on agriculture and irrigation 
systems in order to make the country self-sufficient in food 
stuffs by 1972.6 Modernization of traditional agriculture is 
expected to lead to increases in both the productivity and 
yields of the arable land
According to development theory this can be done in two 
ways: First technological modernization which includes the use 
of chemical fertilizers, improved seeds, plant varieties, and 
improved water supply, would bring about a considerable 
increase in agricultural production. The second way is the 
mobilization of agricultural inputs and techniques inside the 
country.
Afghanistan is a country where the implementation of a 
single and universal agricultural technique may be of little 
use, because the soil, as well as the climate, are different 
in various parts of the country. Thus, the agricultural 
techniques have to be commensurately adjusted to local soil, 
local climatic conditions, and to local factor endowments. 
Some development economists, such as, Gillis, Perkins, Roemer,
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and Snoodgrass, have said that the use of two kinds of 
technological strategies, mechanical package and biological 
package, would lead a nation to progressive agricultural 
development.7
Nonetheless, in a land locked and mountainous country 
such as Afghanistan, the use of the biological package might 
be cheaper and more productive, as this would raise the 
country's agricultural output. The biological package
includes: Chemical fertilizer, pesticides, improved plant
varieties such as corn, wheat, rice, cotton, oilseeds, sugar 
beet, etc. The mechanical package includes: Tractors,
combines, and other relevant machinery and equipments. The 
mechanical package might be of secondary importance in 
Afghanistan.
The country had to some extend used both technological 
strategies right before the communist takeover in 1978. The 
construction of a 145 foot high and 1,740 foot long dam of the 
Helmand Valley Project, with assistance from the U.S. based 
Morrison Knudsen Company(MKC) in 1954, for instance, showed a 
genuine improvement during its early years of operation as for 
example wheat production increased by 51 percent during first 
three years. This is an example of mechanical package 
strategy undertaken by the Afghanistan government which 
increased the acreage of land in the country. By 1969, about 
252,151 jerib of land was brought under cultivation compared 
to 159,522 jeribs in 1966.8
79
In 1368, the Kabul government received a $8 million 
loan from Yugoslavia to undertake the construction of the Hari 
Road Irrigation Project in East Herat.9 The Nangarhar Valley 
Project which includes Naghlu-Daronta Dams, was started in 
1968 with Russian technical and financial assistance. This 
project had affected about 22,898 acres of land of which 
21,186 acres were cultivatable. About 15,000 acres of 
irrigated land was used for two large mechanized state farms 
manned by labor corps from the Ministry of Public Works with 
the help of Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.10
This project was not evaluated on its economic cost and 
benefits. Thus the cost of the project even after its 
completion is said to be much higher than its benefit. 
Besides, the produce from these farms, mainly citrus and 
oranges, were exported to the Soviet Union in return for the 
needed equipment and maintenance used in the same project. 
The main objective for the establishment of this project was 
to raise nationalistic emotions in Western Pakistan by raising 
the so-called obsolete issue of Pushtunistan which resulted in 
blocking trade relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
This in fact provided a golden opportunity for the Soviets to 
enjoy all exportable raw materials of Afghanistan at 
considerably lower prices in-return for their low quality 
consumer goods.
Furthermore, a score of power stations were built in 
Afghanistan with assistance received from several foreign
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countries mainly the Soviet Union and their allies. Table 5-2 
provides a list of all power stations, their location, 
capacity, and working conditions until 1985.
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1952 Government 9,00 kw Functioning 
in full 
capacity
4. Nangarhar 1955 USSR 12,000 kw Functioning 
in Full 
capacity
5. Saroobi 1958 W.Germany 22,000 kw Functioning 
with problems
6. Helmand 1959 USA 28,000 kw Functioning 
with problems
7. Mahiper 1967 W.Germany 22,000 kw Functioning 
with problems
8. Naghlu 1968 USSR 90,000 kw Functioning 
with problems
9. Kajaki 1960 USA 12,000 kw Functioning 
with problems
Source: "The Sovietization of Afghanistan" by S.B. Majrooh, 
"General Geography of Afghanistan", 1950-1952, Information by 
AIC.
Moreover, the mechanization of agriculture in a labor 
abundant country, like Afghanistan, may have a negative impact 
as machinery would be substituted for labor. But this may not 
be the case in several parts of the country. Afghanistan's
population is not that large to worry about, with progress 
more people will be enrolled in schools and employed in 
industries as well as civil services. By that time the 
country may face a labor shortage. The Afghan-Soviets war has 
also decreased the countries population tremendously. The 
number of tractors and combines, metal silos and mechanical 
loading devices introduced into the Afghanistan agriculture 
sector was quite small and limited to several cities. The use 
of large tractors and metal silos in some part of the country 
seems to be highly expensive because of the physical and 
climatic difficulties of those regions.
The introduction of the biological package is of 
significant importance in the country's agriculture sector as 
it is relatively cheap and could bring considerable returns. 
Some Afghan farmers were familiar with, encouraged and trained 
to adopt modern agricultural methods such as the use of 
improved seed varieties, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and 
mechanical power. Table 3-3 shows the fertilizer distribution 
in metric tons in Afghanistan (1974-1978).
Table 5-3 Fertilizer distribution in metric tons.
Year 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Amount 44,615 62,465 69,749 83,420 100,027
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This table shows that the introduction of modern 
techniques was highly appreciated and eagerly accepted by 
Afghan farmers who were accustomed to traditional and 
primitive methods. According to Dr. Azam Gul, two main types 
of fertilizer, compound and urea were regularly used in 
Afghanistan.14 The nationwide use of fertilizer and improved 
seed increased agricultural output by the late 1970s. Wheat 
production, for example, increased from 832kg per hectare in 
1963-64 to 1249kg in 1976-77. The distribution of improved 
seeds to Afghan farmers also increased from 1,470.75 tons in 
1976-77 to 3,000.00 tons in 1977-78, while wheat imports were 
reduced from 238,523 tons in 1972 to 2,500 tons in 1977.15 The 
country nearly became self-sufficient in wheat production by 
1978, as the imported wheat was mainly used for seed purposes.
A large part of the country is occupied by high altitude 
mountains which prevent moisture bearing clouds from reaching 
certain regions of the country resulting in severe water 
shortages. The irrigation system is also operating in a 
primitive way, mostly managed by traditional methods through 
village cooperation or farmers collective decisions. In areas 
where there is a shortage of water supply to irrigate arable 
lands, people have constructed canals and karazes(underground 
canals) to get water to their crops. The government built 
canals do not have sufficient capacity and are not 
constructed in every part of the country. The list of 
irrigation canals constructed with foreign assistance is given
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in table 5-4













1910-1925 Govt. 10,000 Unknown
3. Sardeh/ 
Ghazni





1930 Govt. 10,000 By regime
5.
Arghandab




1954 USA 1,495,000 I II I
7. Qargha/ 
Kabul




1960 USSR 32,00 II II 1
Source: "The Sovietization of Afghanistan" by S.B.Majrooh,
P.56, general geography of Afghanistan 1950-1952, P.89-98. 
The table indicates the establishment period, the site granted 
assistance, and the supply capacity of canals.16
A rapid increase in the use of chemical fertilizers and 
improved seeds in Afghanistan had accompanied the increase of 
various crops such as wheat, the Afghan staple food, rice, 
maize, and barely.
AGRICULTURAL CONDITION AFTER 1978
The 14-year war has in fact decimated the country's 
agricultural infrastructure. This is the main sector which
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was severely affected by the war. The main target of the 
Soviet troops was to destroy the agricultural sector. This was 
the only sector that provided people with food stuffs 
sufficient to survive and resist the invaders. Underground 
canals which were built over centuries, the orchards which 
produce dry and fresh fruit, the karezes and streams, were 
severely damaged and even certain crops ready to harvest were 
set on fire. Millions of mines of various kinds were spread 
over villages and rural areas which resulted in killing of a 
large number of small children. Some mines were disguised as 
toys and children played with them until they exploded. 
Additionally, thousands of livestock were also killed by 
mines.
During the last 14 years much land under cultivation has 
been left fallow; considerable numbers of livestock have been 
destroyed, and agricultural production have decreased 
tremendously. About 6.2 million people have left the country. 
This is almost half of Afghanistan's population and more than 
1.5 million have been killed. Tens of thousands of others 
have been left handicapped and disabled. According to Dr. 
Abdul Qahar Samin's estimation, about 1,400 skilled 
agriculture technocrats have taken refuge in Pakistan.16 Table
5-5 shows the average production and fertilizer use for wheat, 






















































































Source: WUFA V.6 NO.2 Mar-April, 1991.
From the above table it is obvious that the average 
production for certain crops such as wheat, corn, barely, 
rice, and cotton have fallen dramatically over the first four 
years of war. One, of course, can vividly imagine for the 
rest of the war period.
The estimated amount of wheat produced in 1982 was 20% of 
the 1978 level, corn 23%, rice 26%, barely 26%, and cotton 
12%.18 In 1978 only 5,000 tons of wheat was imported. But 
wheat imports increased to 74,000 tons in 1981, and 115,000 
tons by 1982. According to the data released by Europa 
Yearbook, the total cost of imported wheat is estimated at 
U.S.$798,000 for 1981, $18,100,000 for 1982, and $38,255,000 
for the year 1983.19 Table 5-6 shows the production of some
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principle crops in the years 1978, 1987, 1988, and 1989.
Table 5-6: Production of Principal Crops (in 000 metric tons)
Types of 
Crops
1977 1978 1987 1988 1989
Wheat 2,936 2,652 1,925 1,925 1,325
Corn 800 760 685 838 750
Rice 440 400 344 490 490
Barely 400 300 250 250 250
Cotton 159 136.5 111 120 60
Sugarbeet 90.9 97 2 2 2
Sugarcane 68.1 64 60 50 50
Potatoes 345 200 300 300 300
Vegetables 918.2 660 632 212 220
Grapes 471 430 475
Source: Europa Yearbook 1990, "The effect 







This table indicates that with the emergence of the 
Communist regime, the agriculture sector of the economy has 
been seriously affected. The amounts presented in the above 
table seem doubtful as the data is given by the regime. The 
reduction in agricultural production might be much larger than 
those mentioned on the table.
Afghanistan posses highly fertile land for cotton 
production. The northern provinces of Balkh, Smangan, Takhar 
and Kunduz are amongst the best cotton growing regions in the 
world. Crop yields are estimated at 1,000-1,200 kg of cotton 
seed per hectare land. A former French cotton expert in 
Afghanistan says, "The soil is ideal, the cold winters kills
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parasites much better than chemical products, the presence of 
Kukcha River and Amu Darya permit considerable expansion by 
irrigation of cultivable land." Afghan crops were exported to 
the Soviet Union since 1930 in return for consumer goods.
LAND REFORM
The majority of Afghanistan's rural population are poor 
landless peasants who work the land either on the basis of 
sharecropping or one of several other terms of contracts 
agreed to between landlords and farmers. Land reforms were 
direly needed to increase the land's productivity and raise 
the living standards. The size of land holding among Afghan 
peasants were so small that they could not, in most cases, 
produce enough to feed their own families. This can be 
considered one of the main barriers to economic progress. On 
the other hand, members of the Communist party were advising 
landless peasants to rise against the former regimes demanding 
more equality and justice. The rural unrest was not so 
serious as to culminate into a revolution as was claimed by 
the Afghan Communists, because the Afghan farmers were not 
ready to rob others off their property, as it was contrary to 
their religious and cultural values.
The regime under the Afghan monarch, Zaher Shah, had 
intended to adopt land reform policies so that it could curb 
the rural uprising, by giving some pieces of state owned land 
to landless farmers. For this purpose the Afghan regime
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started the implementation of a series of projects, using 
foreign assistance, which provided some land to landless 
peasants. The construction of Helmand Valley Project which 
let the state to settle 3,000 families, mainly pushtoon, and 
1,200 nomads in Nadir Ali District. The new settlers were 
supposed to pay an amount of Afl6,800 ($320) over a 20-year 
period. The title to land was to given to the peasants upon 
fulfilling the term of the contract by making the necessary 
payments.21 Later, during President Daoud's era, the state 
declared additional land reform policies. It was believed 
that the regime would distribute state-owned land, acquired by 
state development projects, to landless farmers. The regime 
announced that a total of 5,371 families received land of 
which 3,930 were located in the Helmand-Valley, 1,269 in
Nangarhar, and 172 in Ghurband.23
In 1975, the regime announced its nationwide land reform 
policy which was intended to be implemented in 1976. Based on 
this law, the limit on land holding was 20 hectare for first 
grade land and 40 hectares for lower grades. The surplus over 
and above this limit was supposed to be confiscated by the 
regime and distributed to the poor in rural areas. The owners 
were paid on a deferred payment plan over a period of 25-years 
at a 2 percent interest rate. The new owners were supposed to 
pay on the same condition and at the same rate of interest.
The Afghan government set up a Rural Development Board to 
study in detail the social and economic conditions prevailing
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in rural areas and to differentiate land into various 
categories. A Commission was dispatched to several parts of 
the country to promote the program but failed to achieve its 
ultimate goal due to criminal actions of the Commission staff. 
They were involved in taking bribes from landlords to register 
their lands far below the above mentioned limits and the two 
categories classified by the regime's authorities. On the 
other hand a large number of landlords, using their social and 
cultural influences, registered their lands in the name of 
their sons, brothers, or other close relatives and hence 
showing lower size of landholding.
The government's intentions were good and the reform 
policy was expedient and no landowner incurred a huge loss. 
Soon, with the emergence of the Communist coup, a series of 
decrees reflecting the socialist reforms was issued by 
President Taraki, the first communist president of 
Afghanistan. Decree No. 6 was about eradication of land 
mortgages and indebtedness. On the basis of this decree all 
lands and loans contracted prior to 21 March 1974 were 
cancelled on the assumption that the accumulated interest and 
yields had already exceeded the original balance. Henry
S.Bradsher writes, "It was claimed that some 11 million 
peasants benefited from the cancellation of $700 million in 
debts, on which a 50 percent rate of interest had not been 
unusual" ,25
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Decree Ho.8 was intended to end the feudal and pre=feudal 
socio-economic relationship through the implementation of a 
land reform policy. Under this decree a family was allowed to 
keep 30 jeribs (14.3 acres) of first grade land, or its 
equivalent of poorer land based on the land's productivity. 
The regime would redeem the surplus land and redistribute it 
free to landless peasants without any compensation to the 
owner.
The land registration and ownership in Afghanistan was to 
some extent vague and even the country's experts have given 
different statistics. Major surveys indicate that about 80 
percent of owners held 29 percent of cultivable land while 
majority of Afghan peasants are tenants who work on lands 
owned by landlords under different types of leasing contracts.
Based on government statistics released in 1978, out of 
an estimated 15.1 million population, about 10,839,087 
peasants were engaged in agricultural activities, and about 70 
percent of all cultivable land is owned by large landlords. 
Table 3.8 shows the distribution of landholding among 
landowners as of 19 7 8 . 26 The following table shows that 70 
percent of Afghanistan's peasants are landless farmers.
On the basis of this table, one can claim that the 
distribution of land was unfair and a significantly wide gap 
existed in this sector of the economy.
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Table 5-7: The distribution of landholding of landowners 
as of 1978.
Size of landholding 
43,821,000 hectares 
70% of all lands
No. of landowners % of
2.02— 05 Hectares 1,084,824 83





Source: Salih M.Zairy, Kabul Times,15 September 1978.27
Table 5-8 shows the distribution of landholding among peasants 
as of 1978.





















Source: Viladimir Glukhoded, "Economy of
Afghanistan", In Afghanistan: Past and Present (Moscow: USSR 
Academy of Science,Oriental in the USSR, No.3,1981). Ministry 
of Planning Afghan Agricultures in Figure (Kabul: Government 
printing House, December 1978) .28
The introduction of expedient land reforms seemed, 
therefore, to be essential in Afghanistan if productivity was 
to be improved and yields increased. But the method adopted 
by communists was not acceptable for Afghans as it was 
contrary to their religious and cultural principles to rob
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someone of his or her property. Hence the majority of Afghan 
farmers refused to take the land offered to them by the 
communist regime and even if they accepted it in some 
exceptional casest ohsy used to secretly share the crops with 
the previous owners, away from the eyes of the government 
agents. Their primary reason was that they could not afford 
to cultivate the land without the owner•s technical and 
financial assistance.
On the contrary, M.Nazif Shahrani, an Afghan 
anthropologist, is of the opinion that the problem is severe 
shortages of land not unequal distribution of it. However, 
land reform policy must be acceptable to Afghan farmers both 
from a culture and religious point of view. The regime could 
distribute state owned land or the government could buy all 
surplus lands from landlords and resell to peasants on 
commensurate deferred payment plans. The statistics given by 
the Communist regime regarding the success of their land 
reform policy seem vague and dubious. Initially officials 
announced that 5 percent of Afghan landlords possessed 45 
percent of the arable lands but soon it was claimed that only 
4 percent of landlords own 50 percent of cultivable lands.
Furthermore, the regime • s Minister of Agriculture claimed 
that 82 percent of Afghan farmers owned 35 percent of the 
agricultural land and almost 11 million peasants would benefit 
by land reform.29 Later, in February 1979, the communist 
regime announced that 2.5 million acres of land were available
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to be distributed for landless peasants. Most of those lands 
were in the northern provinces of Kunduz, Takhar, Badakhshan, 
and Baghlan, as well as western provinces of Nimroze, Farah, 
Helmand, Badghis, and Herat. The distributed land were mainly 
confiscated from private landlords.
The new Soviet installed regime divided the country into 
warm and cold zones and started the implementation of land 
reform policy in January 1979. By the end of February it was 
claimed that about 450,000 jiribs of land were distributed 
among 43,000 peasant families and later by the end of March it 
was claimed that 1,029,000 j iribs of land were distributed to
109,000 families. Meanwhile, twenty-nine other "operation 
groups" of planners were dispatched to cold zones to adopt the 
land reform policy. Soon, by July 1979, the regime officials 
claimed that a total of 2,917,671 j iribs land were distributed 
among 248,114 families.30
The false claims made by the regime becomes clear from 
its released statistics. The initial statistics released by 
regime estimated six million jiribs (about 3 million acres) of 
surplus land and 630,000 landless farmers, while later Radio 
Kabul announced that with the completion of land reform, 
248,114 families received lands. The anti-Soviet-communist 
war was, however, pervasive all over the country by 1983-84, 
which makes it hard to accept that the puppet regime could 
implemented the reforms claimed. Besides, by that time most 
of the agricultural part of the country was captured by
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resistance forces. The regime could not have implemented its 
land reform policy in those regions.
The present Islamic State of Afghanistan must take into 
consideration the unsuccessful experiences of the previous 
regimes and adopt a policy that would be acceptable as well as 
feasible and lead to a more equitable distribution of 
landholding among Afghan peasants. According to Islamic law 
there are two kinds of ownership, private and 
public/government ownership. All surplus and uncultivated 
land including pastures and meadows belong to the Islamic 
state and the state possesses the authority to distribute them 
among landless peasants. Nevertheless, there is no religious 
barrier to implement a land reform policy that would not harm 
anyone.
The communist reform had, in fact, negative impact on 
Afghanistan's agricultural production, as cropland was reduced 
by about 9 percent and grain production dropped by 10 percent. 
The country's national per-capita income dropped by 14 
percent. After six months, Taraki recognized that his 
baseless reform puts more fuel into the resistance machine, he 
announced that the reforms had been completed.32
LIVESTOCK AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY
Livestock and animal husbandry is largely practiced in 
Afghanistan, and about 90 percent of the country's total 
exports was agricultural and animal products. The major
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animals raised in Afghanistan are sheep, goats, cattle, 
horses, donkeys, and mules. Afghanistan once had a monopoly 
in Karakul skins (the persian lamb) exports. In 1950, the 
country had supplied 80 percent of the world Karakul skins to 
New York and London markets.33 The Karakul skins were a good 
source of foreign revenue that could bring hard currency to 
the country.
The Afghan government, in order to encourage its farmers 
to breed more Karakul sheep and thus increase the skin 
production, had founded "Karakul Institute", in 1966. As a 
result by 1969, about 14.5 million skins were auctioned in New 
York and London markets. Karakul Sheep raising is primarily 
practiced in rural areas, especially in mountainous parts of 
the country where a lot of postures and meadows are easily 
available. The Afghan karakul sheep producers were accustomed 
mainly to raising sheep and goats which had high demand and 
attractive markets. Livestock production increased each year 
prior to 1978. The average number of live stock ownership is 
given in table 5-9.
The following table implies that the average number of 
livestock growing in the country was seriously decreasing, and 
the reasons might be rural immigration towards cities as well 
as, to a large extent, the protracted war. It is estimated 
that between 1978 and 1987 there had been about 70 percent 
decline in Karakul sheep and 67 percent decline in ordinary 
sheep and goats owned by average farm family.
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Table 5-9s Livestock ownership Average number per femly.
1978 1980 1985 1986 1987 %
Decrease
Horses 2.17 1.26 1.55 1.19 1.19 44.94
Donkeys & 
Mules
1.74 1.71 1.61 1.62 1.62 6.46
Karakul
sheep
27.64 24.09 17.43 12.27 8.41 69.57
Other sheep and 
goats
42.81 30.92 21.23 16.81 14.33 66.53
Cattle 6.25 5.51 4.27 3.66 3.27 47.65
The main reasons for such huge declines is mentioned by 
Dr.Azam Gul, a former professor of Faculty of Agriculture, 
Kabul University, "the reasons for this may not only be the 
effects of war, but could have been due, direct and 
indirectly, to low rainfall years from 1983 to 1986”.39
The Russian troops as well as the collapsed communist 
regime had intentionally decided to destroy the livestock and 
animal husbandry in the country so that they could put 
pressure on Afghan farmers to depend only on the government's 
social welfare allowance and follow the regime's instructions. 
The low rainfall had, of course, reduced the grazing which 
forced the sheep producers to reduce the size of their flock. 
However, the effect of low rain fall was not as serious as the 
effect of the mines dispersed over all postures, meadows, 
mountains, and arable lands in country. The official 
estimated number of livestock for the years 1987-89 is given
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in table 5-10.
Table 5-10: Livestock (000 head, year ending 30 September) for 
the years 1987-89.
1987 1988 1989
Horses 400 400 400
Mules 30 30 30
Asses 1, 300 1,300 1,300
Cattle 1,500 1,550 1,600
Camels 300 265 265
Sheep 10,500 11,500 12,500
Goats 2,000 2,050 2,100
Source: FOA, Production Yearbook.
Despite the devastating war which has already destroyed 
much of the country, the regime, as shown in Table 5-10 above, 
claims an increase in certain types of animals through 1987- 
89. The government estimates seem dubious and contradictory 
to reality according to some Afghan experts who left the 
country. All farmers and sheep herders, who fled to Pakistan 
or Iran, had no opportunity to go back home and raise animals. 
The impact of 14 years of war, the rain fall, the Soviet's 
heavy air raids, the tens of thousands of mines spread over 
the country, the exodus of some 6 million Afghans, of which 
about 80 percent were farmers, are clear cut reasons why there 
has been a significant drop in the number of livestock in 
Afghanistan.
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NATIONAL PARKS AND FORESTS
National parks and forests are of immense importance for 
both the natural environment and bringing in a considerable 
amount of hard currency, through foreign visitors, to the 
country's economy. National parks are declared environmental 
sanctuaries and hence protected ail over the world. National 
parks, in most developed as well as underdeveloped countries, 
are protected and controlled by governments.
Afghanistan has many beautiful scenic areas praised by 
tourists. The most attractive and highly important national 
parks and forests of Afghanistan are the Pamir region (known 
as the roof of the world), Eandi Amir, Hushmat Khan Reed Bed, 
Ghazni Marshlands, Darqad, Ajar Valley, Hamooni Helmand, 
Nuristan, Kunar and Paktika.
The forests of Kunar and Nuristan are the most famous and 
attractive forests of the country and has amazed foresters, 
tourists, and plant scientists. Today one can hardly find 
those thick forests in the region, because the Soviet invaders 
set them on fire claiming that the resistance could hide 
themselves and launch heavy assaults on the Russian troops.
Paktika forests once were thick and rich in oak and 
poplar trees. These forests extended from Setkoh to Zadran 
and from Khust to Chamkani, Zazai, and Mangal. The Soviet's 
deforestation policy on one side and the people's eagerness to 
supply wood to Pakistan on the other side has largely 
destroyed the forests. Besides the Soviet's daily air raids,
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people living in the region, taking advantage of war 
conditions, started cutting trees and selling them in 
Pakistan's local bazaars in return for money that would help 
them feed their families.
The current regime must control the border and stop the 
illegal supply of wood into Pakistani bazaars as soon as 
possible. The Afghan forests, if saved, could bring major 
benefits both visible and invisible to its economy. The 
present regime must pay more attention to this sector while 
drawing reconstruction plans for the country. The protection 
and restoration of the devastated forests and wildlife is of 
great importance. In this regard the Afghan regime should 
seek help from the international community. The government 
ought to conduct ecologic surveys with the assistance of 
foreign experts and ban hunting of wild animals in relevant 
regions for at least several years to recover from the losses. 
It might be required that the regime set up certain rules and 
policies that could help in protecting and extending the 
country1s forests and wild life.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION
Concluding Remarks
The Afghan nation that became a casualty of the decade 
long Soviet war of occupation (1979-1989) has left this Muslim 
nation utterly destroyed and one of the poorest in Asia. 
Impoverished even before the war with an annual per capita 
income estimated at $130, average life expectancy estimated at 
40 years, and literacy rate at 10%, about 80 percent of the 
peoples of Afghanistan were rural farmers. Agriculture and 
animal husbandry dominate the economy, especially in the 
northern Afghanistan. Many people are self employed as 
farmers in the valleys and plains and as herdsmen in the 
mountainous countryside. Indeed, it was this hardy, tough 
country stock which supported a decade long forceful 
resistance against the Soviet invaders. The country is also 
well endowed with natural resource and a hard working labor 
force.
The industrial sector of the nation was relatively 
undeveloped prior to the Communist coup, April 27, 1978. A 
small number of industrial enterprises such as textiles,
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sugar, plastic, fertiliser, cement, etc. were functioning. 
However, in the late 1970s, major efforts were made to build 
national economy and construct both light and heavy 
industries. An investment law was passed in 1975 that 
provided attractive incentives to private domestic and foreign 
investment.
After gaining its independence from the British in 1919 
and the subsequent political upheaval, Afghanistan enjoyed a 
relatively slow pace of economic development. The country's 
infrastructure such as roads, bridges, irrigation canals, 
power stations, airports, schools, banks, and administrative 
buildings had markedly improved since WWII. Economic growth 
before the 1978 was at a rate of one percent a year which was 
far below the growth rate in other developing nations.
The country' s economic development since World War II has 
been influenced by government policies. Both the Afghan king 
Zahir and his cousin president Daoud were largely influenced 
by socialist ideology imported from the former USSR. They, 
therefore, adopted a policy of a state guided economy. The 
ruling circles of Afghanistan, by any means and tools, 
emphasized expension of the public sector and state's 
interference in the economic sphere. This, however, slowed 
down the process of rapid economic progress in the country.
Despite its already deplorable economic conditions, the 
national economy stagnated after communist coup in 1978. It 
has been completely devastated since the Soviet invasion. The
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armed resistance to Soviets has resulted in the destruction of 
roads, bridges, and villages, the exodus of more than five 
million refugees, the large internal population displacement, 
the destruction of household animals, the destruction of 
irrigation canals, and the devastation of agriculture, all 
contribute to the economic plunge of the country.
Presently, Afghans are suffering from the absence of 
proper administration, provision of basic necessities, and are 
struggling to find a way to cope with the impending dangers of 
millions of mines sown by Soviets through out the country. 
Today, all roads and bridges are crumbling, irrigation 
systems, arable lands, orchards, and livestock breeding farms 
are nearly nonexistent. The nation's infant industries have 
been severely damaged and a considerably large part of the 
young generation has been denied an opportunity to acquire an 
education.
The country is, of course, in serious need of 
international assistance to build its infrastructure and to 
restore its prewar economic status. For a long time the 
ruling circles of Afghanistan followed a policy of guided 
economic planning involving direct and sustained State 
interference in economic spheres. The only result was more 
backwardness, more poverty, more unemployment, declining 
living standard, lower national income and national poverty. 
The time has changed and so does the need of the Afghan 
society. Let us follow a policy that has been proved
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successful in other developing nations. In fact a freer 
economic policy with a large participation of domestic 
capitalists in economic development process would increase 
productivity and improve the nation1s living condition. A 
relatively open economic policy is a dire need of the present 
day Afghanistan.
A Policy Recommendation
There is a crying need for restoring the devastated economic 
condition of war-torn Afghanistan. With the end of fourteen 
years of military hostility and the ongoing repatriation of 
more than five million refugees, economic development and 
rapid growth are indispensable. There should be maximum 
utilization of the nation's resource as well as the aid and 
grants, to be received, from international circles for the 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country. Otherwise 
the long-suffering people of Afghanistan will remain trapped 
in a vicious circle of illiteracy, backwardness, and poverty.
The main purpose of a development plan is to raise 
national output, and improve productivity. Output can be 
raised by shifting resources from low productivity to high 
productivity uses. In Afghanistan, the gradual shift of 
manpower from agriculture to industry and services would be of 
vital importance. Another way to raise output is to provide 
manpower with more resources and sophisticated production 
equipment, techniques, capital formation, and necessary
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facilities. The improvement of quality of plant, equipment, 
tools, raw materials, and new methods used in industry would 
also raise the level of output.
In Afghanistan, particularly, the use of better seed, 
good quality fertilizer, improved animal husbandry, better 
gardening, and well organized poultry and fishing will boost 
national output. Since Afghanistan depends, to a large 
extent, on foreign trade, improving the patterns of foreign 
trade may enable the country to raise average price of goods 
and services of its exports relative to the average price of 
its imports. Agriculture, trade, and handicrafts are the 
basis of economic growth in initial stage of 
industrialization. The experiences of China, Korea, and Japan 
indicate that development of both agriculture and labor 
intensive industries would generate handsome dividends. 
Agriculture is the root and base of economic development in 
Afghanistan. The improvement of agro-industrial sector in 
Afghanistan will be accompanied with more prosperity and 
economic progress.
A combination of labor, land, capital, and raw materials 
will increase the national output tremendously. Education 
will improve both the quality and the quantity of inputs 
through providing well trained and skilled labor. Saving and 
investment are also crucial in boosting up the level of 
national output.
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Presently a large part of the Afghanistan' s land is 
occupied by mines sown by Russian troops. An intensive land 
clearing operation is essential to increase the quantity of 
land under production. Improvement of irrigation canals, 
availability of fertilizers, and introduction of new 
techniques will improve the productivity of lands under 
cultivation. However, the size of land holding is extremely 
small in many parts of the country and hence the Afghan 
farmers can't afford heavy machinery. A village cooperative 
unit should be set up to provide tractors and other related 
equipment and rent them out to farmers.
Development strategy in present Afghanistan, in my 
opinion, should be based on the following principles: 
Fulfillment of human basic needs such as food, water, cloth, 
and shelter. A relatively open economy, encouragement of huge 
flow of foreign capital, significant reforms of agrarian 
structure, encouragement and support of private domestic 
industries. More emphasize should be made on building and/or 
rebuilding of small scale and light industries. Establishment 
of heavy industry can be part of the sate's long term plan.
A reconstruction survey team ought to be formed and 
dispatched to various parts of the country to implement 
development projects. In the case of industrial construction, 
it is, however, hard to say what types of industrial 
development would be efficient in Afghanistan's changing 
circumstances. All industries built before war are severely
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damaged by bombing raids of Russian troops and rocket 
shillings of rival-guerrilla factions. In initial stage of 
industrial establishments, the Afghan government must 
emphasize repairing and rebuilding the already destroyed 
industries. Indeed, industrial reconstruction will create a 
mass population movement from rural areas towards cities. To 
stop such population influx into cities, rural reconstruction 
should be given priority. Rural areas have been severely 
damaged by the war. Since more than 80 percent of the 
nation's population lives countryside, the reconstruction of 
this sector will improve the economic condition of the country 
significantly.
Macroeconomic Policies
The use of appropriate fiscal and monetary policies has 
a far reaching effect on income distribution, employment, 
efficiency, mobilization of domestic savings, expedient 
allocation of domestic resources, and economic stability.
Monetary Policy
Monetary policy simply means any action taken by monetary 
authorities of a nation to change the quantity and cost of 
money and to influence the composition and age profile of the 
national debt. At present juncture, the main problem that 
Afghan policymakers will have to deal with is the runaway 
inflation prevailing in the country. Such inflation, of
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course, could be fatal and destructive of economic processes. 
In fact, a continuous increase in the overall price level has 
severely threatened the already weary living standard of the 
Afghan nation. Serious measures should be undertaken if 
Afghans are to solve the problem of rampant inflation. 
Otherwise, the economic and social havoc brought about by 
hyperinflation will create further large budgetary deficit, 
economic collapse, declining living standard, lower real 
income, inflationary expectations, and lower purchasing power.
Traditional economic theory recommends two methods to 
curb inflation: The restriction of credits associated with an 
increase in interest rate and tax rises. In present day 
Afghanistan, the policy of interest rate has no significance 
because there is no advanced capital market and no 
entrepreneurs whose investments could be substantially 
influenced by interest rates. On the other hand, with the 
revival of a strong Islamic movement in the country, the 
policy of interest rate may generate further social problems.
Likewise, taxation policy will also be seriously resisted 
by local upper and middle class capitalists and landlords. 
The use of appropriate tax policy will help curb inflation and 
accelerate the process of economic development. The 
experience of Bolivia indicates that a substantial cut in 
spending and increase in taxes will tremendously lower the 
ongoing hyperinflation. In the case of Bolivia, for instance, 
the inflation was estimated at 25,000 percent during 1985.
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The government intended not to spend more than it collected in 
taxes, and by 1989 the hyper inflation was as low as slightly 
over 7 percent.
In Afghanistan, particularly, a substantial reduction in 
money supply, and adoption of a spending policy, though hard, 
similar to that of Bolivia would enable the state to fight 
soaring inflation. Open market operation and increasing the 
reserve requireaer;ts of banks of Afghanistan are the 
alternative policy tools to fight inflation. Open market 
operation is a powerful tool but may not be applicable in 
Afghanistan since the nation's securities market is not 
sufficiently developed.
An intensive economic recovery program requires the 
functioning of advanced and up-to-date banking institutions. 
Banks should provide a suitable framework for financial 
processes and facilitate economic circulation. Banks of 
Afghanistan should actively participate in the nation's 
economic life and initiate actions aimed at rapid economic 
progress. They should be organized in such a way that they 
can influence the quantity of money in circulation, its 
distribution, and direct the flow of money in accordance with 
the primary requirements of the economic development.
Another major problem that Afghanistan has to deal with 
is its huge balance of payment deficit and its indebtness. 
Regrettably, the country has inherited a large budget deficit 
and a considerably large amount of loans from previous
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regimes. An appropriate use of both monetary and fiscal 
policy would help solve this problem.
Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy is a government policy tool used to 
influence the level of aggregate demand and bring about output 
equilibrium. It operates through the tax and expenditure 
sides of the government budget. The use of an appropriate tax 
policy will boost public savings and generate substantial 
amount of state revenue which in turn goes to the public in 
terms of government expenditure. Today, the nation's tax 
administration is destroyed and no taxes have been collected 
since 1979. Serious measures are needed to improve and 
rebuild tax administrations around the country. An ameliorate 
tax rate should be set and all taxable individuals must be 
taxed.
Enactment of both direct and indirect taxes is crucial in 
raising state revenue. However, taxation should be widespread 
through out the country. In the past, tribal chieftains of 
southern Afghanistan were exempted from government taxes and 
military services. A new tax system, should allow no such 
exceptions? every eligible individual must be taxed.
It might be advisable to define a minimum tax free income 
level and whoever earns over and above that level must be 
taxed. In areas where the government has built and/or builds 
modern irrigation system and provides other opportunities to
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increase crop production, it is, however, reasonable to lew 
income tax on those concerned. The income tax should be 
imposed on those working in government offices, industries, 
and commercial companies.
While adopting direct taxes on enterprises, steps must be 
taken to encourage foreign enterprises to invest in the 
country. Since foreign enterprises send out a large part of 
their profit, it is reasonable to levy an expedient profit tax 
on foreign enterprises so that part of their profit remains in 
the country. In short span of time, a tax holiday period must 
be announced in order to encourage direct foreign investment.
When planning the relevant steps for the reconstruction 
of the country, one ought to be well aware of all the short, 
middle, and long term consequences of policy measures. 
Foreign investors are more likely to be concerned with the 
ways and means by which they can avoid tax increases and 
generate more profits. The encouragement of foreign direct 
investment is essential for rapid economic growth and 
industrial reconstruction of the country. Foreign enterprises 
bring in capital intensive machinery, new technology, create 
thousands of jobs, and improve productivity.
Domestic enterprises should be subject to a steeply 
progressive tax. When determining tax rate, the luxury 
articles and necessary consumption goods must be 
distinguished. Eventhough the tax rate on staple goods may be 
lower, the tax turnover could be higher. I would recommend a
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considerably lower tax rate to be levied on what are 
considered simi-luxury items in Afghanistan, specially on 
products for which there is not domestic industry. Because a 
heavy tax rate on such goods would affect the declining living 
standard of the long-suffering masses of the country. 
However, differences should be made between goods imported and 
those manufactured at home.
Personal properties such as land, rental houses, shops, 
restaurants, business complexes, transport vehicles, etc. must 
be subject to taxes. The nation's land should be divided into 
different categories based on the type of soil and land 
productivity and each category must be taxed accordingly.
In addition to levying various types of direct and 
indirect taxes, the government can generate a substantial 
amount of revenue through implementation of religious taxes 
and collection of optional charities. Based on the Islamic 
principles, the wealth over and above the poverty level is 
subject to 2.5 percent tax rate (Zakat). This includes 
currency, treasured or in circulation, gold and silver, and 
other miscellaneous merchandize goods. According to Islamic 
law agricultural product is also subject to 5 to 10 percent 
tax (Usher) based on availability of irrigation facilities. 
In the case of an expensive irrigation system, a 5 percent tax 
is recommended. Likewise, livestock has to be taxed in 
accordance with Islamic principles.
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The government of Afghanistan should establish Sak&t and 
Usher foundations through out the country. The foundation 
must collect tax revenues and redistribute them to poor in 
related areas. This would, of course, help narrow down the 
gap between rich and poor thus bringing about an equitable 
income distribution.
Taxes on Foreign Trade
According to international economic theory, free trade 
raises the trading partner's output and improves their
economic conditions. However, all nations, more or less, 
impose some restrictions on free flow of foreign trade.
Indeed high rates of trade barriers would impose further
losses on the suffering Afghan consumers. On the other hand 
paying higher prices for imported products will reduce
domestic private incomes. Trade barriers will squeeze a large 
number of costumers out of the market since they can't pay 
higher prices. Such trade policy will indeed reduce the 
already poor living standard of the Afghan masses.
Since Afghanistan is a small nation the imposition of a 
high tariff rate will not affect prices on foreign markets but 
in will raise, by the full amount of the tariff, the domestic 
price for imported items. Most such items are not produced 
domestically so it will only affect domestic consumers. I 
would, therefore, strongly recommend a lower tariff rates for 
the country. All importable commodities that are not produced
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by domestic industries must not be subject to heavy tariff.
In the past, Afghanistan was markedly dependent upon 
import duties. A large part of state revenue was derived from 
taxes on imported items. As a result the Afghan consumers 
were denied an opportunity to possess a radio or TV. This 
policy created smuggling activities and improved the 
underground economy.
Considering the particular character of Afghan society, 
I would suggest that in the long run, a higher duty rates on 
imported items viewed as necessities such as food, grains, 
oil, etc. to be imposed. Since such goods can be produced 
more efficiently by domestic firms, the imposition of a higher 
tariff rate would increase domestic production. The 
government can regulate domestic prices of such consumption 
items in order to protect its low income residents against any 
price hikes.
I would suggest a lower rates of duty to be imposed on 
consumer simi-luxury goods such as appliances, cameras, 
videos, refrigerator, and so on. The enactment of a higher 
duty rate on such goods may not produce higher revenue but it 
lowers the people's living standard. A lower import duty rate 
would enable a large percentage of population to consume simi- 
luxurious items and hence increases the total volume of tax 
revenue and improve the national living standard.
Moreover, a tariff has a profound impact on the nation's 
balance of payment. It will reduce the trade deficit but at
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the expense of domestic consumers because Afghanistan is an 
import dependent nation. This is not an efficient way to 
reduce the deficit.
Export duties, however, must be kept considerably low so 
that exportable industries can expand rapidly. The government 
must create incentives to promote its exportable industries. 
If necessary, a tax holiday period should be offered for some 
export industries. Taxes on exports must not exceed 10% of 
total tax revenue at least during the first five years of 
economic recovery.
Government Expenditure
The improvement and reconstruction of public sector is 
extremely important. Presently all roads and bridges are 
either destroyed or seriously damaged. Most school and 
administrative buildings, particularly in rural areas, are 
turned into rouble. Health care centers and local clinics are 
completely destroyed while hospitals in major cities are 
severely damaged. Irrigation canals, communication
facilities, and telephone lines are severely damaged or 
destroyed.
Repairing these damages, of course, requires huge 
government expenditures. The repair of damages sustained by 
Afghanistan's infrastructure is far beyond the ability of the 
government, and needs a large participation from international 
humanitarian agencies to help rebuild.
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In the first five years major effort should be made to 
ensure the reconstruction of key institutional structures such 
as administration agencies,health, transportation, education, 
and so on. However, the government expenditure should as 
follows:
1. A mine clearing commission must be established with the 
help of international circles and well trained groups 
should be dispatched to various parts of the country to 
clear the mine fields sown by Russian troops.
2. Reconstruction of the nation's economic infrastructure 
such as roads, communication, power stations, irrigation 
systems, school buildings, local government 
administrations, and local police stations are extremely 
essential in the first phase of recovery.
3. Encourage, subsidize, and support agriculture sector to 
increase crop production, animal breeding, and other 
related products.
4. Spending on national defense, administrative facilities, 
education, health care, and social welfare should also be 
give priority.
5. Providing reserve funds for central authorities and 
managing repayment of foreign loans are essential.
It is hard to expect a basic balance between revenues and 
expenditures in a low income state such as Afghanistan. 
Indeed, expenditures, by a large amount, exceed revenues 
collected through taxation. Including foreign assistance in
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state revenue would enable the government to strike a basic 
balance between revenues and expenditure. Government 
expenditure, in most cases, must be undertaken in such a 
manner that brings about an appropriate allocation of domestic 
resources. The government must encourage and persuade 
domestic private investors to firmly participate in 
reconstruction of public sector economy. A combination of 
government and private projects can be implemented to 
reconstruct roads, bridges, private houses, etc..
Microeconomic Policies
On the microeconomic level close attention should be paid 
to reconstruction of damaged and/or destroyed projects. The 
main target of the government plan must be to meet the basic 
needs of the distressed Afghan people. Hence increasing 
bumper crops, introduction of better seeds and fertilizers, 
rebuilding of private houses, improvement of orchards, and 
animal husbandry are important in initial phase of economic 
recovery. Such a policy would certainly lead to self- 
sufficiency of Afghans living in countryside. The immediate 
need and requirements of various sectors are discussed briefly 
in the pages that follow.
Rebuilding the Banking System
Central Bank: The central bank of Afghanistan
(D'Afghanistan Bank), is a government agency which operates as
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a bank and accepts deposits and makes loans. Central bank is 
committed to provide some major functions:
(a) . To print currency and control the supply of money in
circulation.
(b) . To concentrate necessary funds for the construction
and/or reconstruction of development projects.
(c) . To manage and organize the privileges of borrowing at the
discount rate and to provide liquidity to other banks in 
the case of any serious financial troubles.
(d) . To manage and organize the purchases and sales of
government securities and bank notes.
(e) . To make monetary policy decisions and work as a banker to
other banks.
(f). To provide banking services to foreign banks, 
governments, and other financial institutions.
The banks of Afghanistan have been severely damaged and 
thus require essential measures to restore their prewar 
status. In the short run efforts must be made to repair and 
reorganize the destroyed banks. The Afghan commercial and 
development banks are extremely important both in the short 
term and in the long term. The Central Bank of Afghanistan, 
the Afghanistan Bank, must reopen branches in all provinces 
and major cities around the country.
While the Afghan National Bank remains under the 
government control, the rest of the banks must be promoted and 
operated through private sector. The government ought to
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encourage, support, and provide security for all commercial 
and development banks to open branches in provinces, towns, 
and villages through out the country* This will lead to a 
better allocation of domestic national savings.
Agricultural Sector
Since agriculture is the foundation of economic 
development in Afghanistan, the improvement of this sector 
requires a measure of prioritization. Especially in view of 
the fact that more than 80% of the nations s population derives 
their livelihood from this sector. The following tasks are 
needed to be done in order to rebuild the agriculture sector.
1. A fact finding commission must be set up and dispatched 
to various parts of the country to determine the present 
statistics on existing cultivable land, its productive 
capacity, irrigation canals, natural resources, animal 
breeding, and private orchards. The commission should 
also determine the extent losses sustained by this 
sector.
2. Serious measures should be undertaken to repair the 
irrigation canals, defuse mines on cultivable lands, 
protect forestry, and improve plantations around the 
country.
3. Private domestic capitalists should be encouraged to 
provide Afghan farmers with primary agricultural 
equipment, improved seeds, chemical fertilizers, etc. .
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However, the government should completely supervise 
the sales and credit activities of the private agencies 
and prevent them from exploiting the low income farmers. 
In the short term, government can undertake such 
activities to help people, but in the long-run it
promotes corruption, dishonesty, and nepotism which in 
turn will hurt low income farmers. Only the influential 
landlords will benefit from state run agencies for the 
distribution of agricultural materials as they can easily 
bribe the committee members and the government officials. 
Private agencies should be encouraged and advised to 
provide these facilities to farmers on the basis of
deferred payments and profit and loss sharing loans. The 
agricultural development bank of Afghanistan can help 
private entrepreneurs in this regards.
4. A committee of experts and local farmers should be formed 
to survey underground water supply, Karezes, ditches, 
soil types and conditions, and the need of local farmers 
in the areas where there are cultivable lands but without 
surface water. Again, private entrepreneurs must be 
encouraged to provide facilities such as water pumps,
equipment for drilling deep wells in related areas. A
village cooperative unit could be set to achieve this 
goal.
5. Establish and/or repair small scale manufacturing plants 
and firms that can provide primary agricultural tools and
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equipment.
6. Encourage the establishment of firms that can use modern 
storing techniques to accumulate vegetables, fresh fruit, 
and provide canned juice for internal and external 
consumption during all seasons.
7. Encourage and promote animal breeding in rural areas, 
particularly in mountainous parts of the country. The 
government should encourage the import of improved 
livestock that can adapt to climatic situation of the 
country. All state farms must be transferred to private 
farmers in order to increase productivity. Promote the 
expansion of poultry farms, fisheries, and horticulture 
around the country.
8. Improve and protect national parks, forests, and other 
areas for the development of tourism. Enact strict 
animal protection and hunting laws. Initiate 
afforestation programs and planting of trees and flowers, 
especially on the sides of highways, roads, and national 
parks. Also promote planting of orchards and fruit 
trees.
Industrial Sector
For a long time, steps were taken to promote state owned 
industries. However, during late 1970s, President Daoud made 
some efforts to encourage the private sector to grow along 
with the public sector. A capital investment law was enacted
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which provided some incentives to attract domestic and foreign 
investment. After the communist coup this law was abolished 
and private industries were nationalized. The nation's 
industries have been severely damaged by war. In the initial 
phase of industrial recovery the following things need to be 
done:
1. Repair and encourage traditional handicrafts such as 
Afghan rugs and kelim (gelum) weaving, and small cottage 
industries.
2. Repair and reconstruct the already destroyed and/or 
damaged industries that were established before the war. 
Emphasize construction of small scale labor intensive 
industries. Such projects should be designed and carried 
out by domestic private investors. These projects must 
be established in provinces other than Kabul in order to 
avoid crowding and pollution in the capital city.
3. Reconstruct and/or establish small, medium, and large 
power stations in major cities and towns of the country 
depending on the social cost and benefits of such 
projects. Establish small hydro-electric power plants in 
rural areas and villages around the country.
4. Encourage and support the establishment of firms that can 
undertake the utilization of the nation's natural gas and 
oil for domestic uses. In the short term, serious 
measures must be undertaken to construct pipelines from 
northern Afghanistan to Kabul city to supply natural gas
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for domestic uses. The pipelines must cross the most 
densely populated areas. Private firms and entrepreneurs 
must be encouraged to undertake this job. Foreign 
companies must be encouraged to help domestic firms for 
the extraction of oil and construction of refinery plants 
in northern Afghanistan.
Repair and develop industries to extract national mineral 
resources. Since mineral resources are public
properties, the government should undertake an 
appropriate use of national mineral deposits.
Enact private investment law to attract domestic and 
foreign investment in the country. Provide necessary 
capital and short and long term loans for industrial 
development projects. Encourage the provision of raw 
materials through free competition from domestic and 
foreign markets.
As part of the long term plan, construction of heavy 
industries that provide electric power and expand 
economic infrastructures should be emphasized. Also 
necessary is the provision of required training for the 
professional personnel, skilled labor force, and highly 
qualified technocrats.
Expand the activities for industrial development of 
Afghanistan so that it can help the process of economic 
development and support the expansion of private domestic 
industries.
9 o Protect domestic infant industries against foreign
competition until they gain the power to compete in 
international markets. Create competitive environment 
among domestic firms and prevent merging as well as 
monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic competition.
Transport and Communication
Rebuilding the nation's transport and communication 
networks has a profound impact on economic development of the 
country. The following urgent steps must be taken to improve 
this sector.
1. Create a survey committee and dispatch its members to 
different parts of the country to collect information and 
statistics regarding the destruction sustained by this 
sector.
2. Concentrate on building and reconstruction of principle 
highways, roads, and bridges that have been crumbling as 
a result of the war. Necessary steps must be taken to 
asphalt all highways and roads that connect the capital 
with provinces and major cities around the country. 
Repair and/or construct roads that connect villages to 
towns and cities. In this case the government may seek 
help from local villagers by encouraging volunteer works. 
In the past, local people were engaged in construction of 
roads by means of mardikar or corvee labor. Today, local 
residents will overwhelmingly participate in
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reconstruction and repairing of roads that connect 
villages to major cities. Asphalting all roads and 
streets of the country can be part of the state*s long 
term planning. Construction of a strong railway network 
which was planned by President Daoud can be resumed .as 
part of state's long term planning.
3. Repair and reconstruct national airports and improve air 
services for both domestic and international passengers.
4. In the first stage of recovery emphasize must be laid on 
repairing and improving facilities for local telephone 
service, particularly in major cities and towns, and 
increase the long distance telecommunication services. 
Expand telephone lines to all cities, towns, and villages 
around the country. Expand and improve international 
telecommunication services as well. In this regard 
Afghanistan' s national communication agency may seek help 
from some foreign telephone companies such as AT&T and 
MCI.
5. Provide and accelerate the development of modern postal 
services in all cities, towns and villages through out 
the country.
Education
All out efforts are needed to restore prewar educational 
status and expand education around the country. The 
government and international humanitarian aid agencies must
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take urgent steps to improve educational standards of the 
country. Before the communist coup, the nation's literacy 
rate was the lowest in Asia while after the coup education was 
disrupted and as a result a large percentage of population was 
denied an opportunity to acquire education. Today the 
nation's schools and colleges are destroyed. In the initial 
stage of reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan, 
special attention must be paid to reopen schools for both male 
and female children and adults throughout the country. In 
this regard the following urgent steps are needed.
1. Form a survey team to collect information and statistics 
about the damages incurred by Afghan schools. Rebuild 
and repair school buildings in villages, towns, and large 
cities. Establish primary schools in villages around the 
country. Primary, middle, and high school education must 
be universal and compulsory in the nation.
2. Provide and freely distribute books and other relevant 
educational materials and facilities to all primary, 
middle, and secondary schools. Establish libraries and 
provide books that encourage and develop student's 
abilities to acquire more sophisticated knowledge outside 
classrooms.
3. Establish and expand vocational training and adult 
literacy schools for disabled and injured children, and 
those who were denied to acquire education during the war 
period, for any reason. Training and education of
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present youths of age (8-25) is extremely important to 
overcome the shortage of professionals and the skilled 
labor force.
Introduce new teaching materials and methods in schools 
and colleges. Provide laboratories and technical 
instruments for practical work, to the students in 
primary, middle, and secondary schools. Revise subjects 
to be taught at schools and introduce a better school 
curriculum During the Soviet occupation many Islamic 
subjects were dropped from the school curriculum and 
instead subjects related to communist ideology and 
Russian political history were introduced. The new 
curriculum must include Islamic subjects. Also further 
attention should be paid to restore and improve the 
nation's teachers training schools and colleges.
Urgent efforts are required, on the part of government 
and international humanitarian aid agencies, to take 
steps to restore higher education. Serious measures must 
be adopted to develop universities and colleges in 
accordance with the requirement of present day 
educational standards. However, priority should be given 
to recruit professionals in fields that have direct link 
with development process of the country.
All national universities should be linked with 
universities and educational institutions of friendly 
nations abroad. Previously Kabul university had good
relations with universities in the USA, USSR, France, 
Germany, and many other western nations. It also had 
good relations with universities in Egypt and other
middle eastern countries. Such relationships must be 
resumed and promoted so that Afghan students can acquire 
higher education abroad.
7. Establish a university where subjects are taught in
English and connect it with international schools. This 
will improve both the quality and the quantity of 
education inside the country. This university must 
invite international students for acquiring education in 
various fields. It will also help the Afghan economy as 
foreign students will bring in hard currency to cover 
their expenses during their stay in Afghanistan.
8. Major efforts are needed to open scientific research 
centers that have direct link with development and 
industrialization of the country.
Health and Social Welfare
1. Repair and reconstruct all hospitals, clinic, and health
care centers that have been severely damaged. Rebuild 
and/or construct small clinic and health centers to cure 
rampant disease such as malaria, tuberculosis...., in 
villages, towns, and small cities around the country. 
Provide basic needs and necessary facilities to such 
health centers in related regions. Serious attention
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should be given to health situation of women, children, 
widows, orphans, and those are suffering mental illness 
because of the war. Educate and train Afghan women 
physicians and nurses in the country. Emphasize the 
improvement of public and preventive health programs such 
as vaccination, water, and sanitation. Provide
facilities to improve malnutrition in the country. Build 
centers for veterinary purposes in related areas.
2. Establish special centers of psychotherapy, mother and 
child care. It is extremely important to open nursing 
courses in rural areas. Establish centers for providing 
artificial limbs and firms for assembling wheelchairs, 
and tricycles to help those who became victims of Soviet 
aggression during the occupation.
3. Construct houses for widows and orphans of the war and 
provide small scale handicraft firms for them so that 
Afghan widows and orphans can make a better living and 
become independent. Establish special vocational schools 
and training centers for such people.
4. Encourage domestic and foreign companies to start 
production pharmaceutical supplies and relevant drugs inside 
the country. Encourage the foundation of a small or medium 
size research center to fight cancer ant other costly disease.
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Conclusion
While this plan emphasizes the improvement of private 
sector and calls for a relatively open economic policy, it 
concedes the important role of the State in the economic 
sphere, particularly in a society such as Afghanistan. The 
State should adopt measures that leads to appropriate 
allocation of the nation's domestic resources. Providing 
security and an attractive environment will expand private 
domestic and foreign investment in the country. We have 
already tried a public sector economy. The result was more 
backwardness, more corruption, idle resources, and idle labor 
force. Let us try something new. A relatively open economic 
policy with positive state interventions in economic life will 
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